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Working Paper 3: 
Integration and Co-ordination of DDR and SALW Control 
Programming: Issues, Experience and Priorities 
 
Owen Greene, Duncan Hiscock, Catherine Flew 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the inter-relationships in post-conflict contexts between DDR 
programmes and processes on the one hand, and wider arms management and SALW 
control programmes on the other. It is a contribution to the international project on „DDR 
and Human Security: Post-conflict security building and the interests of the poor‟, and 
aims to complement the four other Thematic working papers of this Project. It argues that 
greater co-coordination, and often integration, between DDR and civilian arms 
management/reduction programmes is needed to promote human security in most 
countries emerging from conflict, within the framework of a wider comprehensive 
strategy for enhancing security from fear and violence that also includes security sector 
reform.  
 
1.1   Background   
In recent years, the international community has aimed to support numerous states faced 
with the challenges of transition towards sustainable peace after a period of large-scale 
violent conflict. This has required both short-term priorities – to stabilise the country, 
address urgent humanitarian needs and begin reconstruction, and promote 
implementation of the peace-settlement  – and a longer-term goal: to shape conditions 
that will prevent societies from sliding back towards conflict by providing stable 
foundations for human security and development. In the same period, security has 
quickly risen up the development agenda as donors have come to understand that a basic 
level of security (for individuals and communities as well as for states) is a crucial 
precondition for economic and social development as well as peace-building. The nexus 
of conflict, security and development has become a key focus for international policy and 
programming. In the process, understandings of „security‟ and „development‟ have 
broadened considerably, overlapping and blurring at the edges. As they have expanded a 
variety of new or developed programmes and processes have been developed to fill the 
spaces into which they are moving. This is particularly true for missions to support 
peace-building and security in post-conflict countries. In this post-conflict context, 
amongst the most prominent of these new programme areas is disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes.  
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DDR processes are in many ways intrinsic to the process of war-termination and post-
conflict recovery. In that sense they have a long history. However, specific and co-
ordinated programmes and measures to support disarmament, demobilisation and re-
integration processes is a more recent development; with relatively intense „lesson-
learning processes since the early 1990s, leading to revised guidelines culminating in 
well-developed United Nations „Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-
integration Standards‟ (IDDRS) published in 2006. 
 
A primary motivation for UN and other international support for DDR programmes in 
post-conflict countries are to contribute to military and state stabilisation and security, 
and to promote appropriate demobilisation of armies and militias to reduce the risks that 
war may resume. However, aims and objectives of DDR programmes have increasingly 
adopted a broader approach that acknowledges the importance also of „human security‟, a 
people-centric approach that stresses „freedom from fear‟ and from pervasive threats to 
people‟s and communities‟ rights, safety, or lives.1  
 
In recent years, there has been similar international emphasis and support for 
programmes in a number of other security-related spheres, including transitional justice, 
control of small arms and light weapons (SALW), security sector reform (SSR), and mine 
action. To a greater or lesser extent, these programme areas address individual and 
community security as well as state stabilisation. Furthermore, the policy literature in 
these fields has often acknowledged the potential impact they may have on poverty 
reduction and development, even if this relationship is rarely explored in any detail
2
. 
 
Thus, programmes to support DDR, SSR, SALW control, mine action and transitional 
justice have become relatively „standard‟ and familiar elements of post-conflict peace-
support missions. Despite their obvious linkages and commonalities, however, they 
remain separate programming areas. Those responsible for the design, initiation and 
implementation of any one of these programme types are very aware (or should be) that 
each is highly complex and challenging.  
 
The history of the development of DDR programmes illustrates this point. As policy-
makers and practitioners have got to grips with the complex challenges to be addressed 
by DDR, the good-practice guidelines drawn from experience have grown in size and 
complexity. The UN‟s Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), which are widely accepted to 
be authoritative, runs to some 25 chapters totalling over 800 pages.  It is easy to lampoon 
                                           
1
 The concept of „human security‟ is briefly defined detail below; it is analysed more fully in the literature 
review „DDR Framed from a Human Security and Pro-Poor Perspective‟ carried out for this project. 
2
 There have nevertheless been some substantial studies on the relationships between security-building 
programmes and development: AVPI project (CICS; 2005); SAS (2005).  
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such a massive document intended to be a guide to busy policy-makers and practitioners, 
and there is clearly a daunting task facing those responsible for ensuring its wide 
dissemination and promoting its use. However, the scale of the document partly reflects 
an appropriate desire to present guidelines and advice for necessarily complex 
programmes that can be customised according to specific local circumstances – not a 
simple but inflexible blueprint. To take another example, the topic of SALW control is 
similarly multi-faceted: the UN and other agencies have identified at least eight major 
component parts to SALW control and numerous other „enabling activities‟.3  
 
The result is that although the international community has a powerful „toolbox‟ of 
security-related measures in post-conflict situations, these tools are complex, and it is 
often unclear how they can be used in combination. Almost every analysis and policy 
paper acknowledges the need to „integrate‟, „coordinate‟ or „mainstream‟ each strand of 
security programme with all others. However, practical proposals as to how such 
integration or coordination might be achieved are rare.  
 
 1.2   Structure of Working Paper 
This Working Paper examines the inter-relationships between DDR processes and 
programmes on the one hand and SALW (and other arms) management and control 
programmes on the other. SALW management, reduction and control is a relatively new 
area of programming, but its importance as a security intervention in post-conflict 
situations is increasingly being recognised, as reflected for example by its prominence 
within the IDDRS (see Section 3). 
 
Although it is easy to recognise that DDR and SALW control activities are connected, 
there has been limited detailed examination of where and how the linkages between the 
two programme areas operate and are important, or indeed where they are not. This has 
obstructed efforts to identify and explore the priorities for co-ordination and finding 
synergies between them; probably resulting in missed opportunities and reduced 
effectiveness of programmes in both issue areas. This Working Paper therefore aims to 
address this gap, and has three key aims: 
 
 To explore and clarify the relationships and co-ordination between DDR and SALW 
control processes and programmes, in principle and in practice;  
 
 To examine the implications of inter-relationships of DDR and SALW control 
programmes and processes for their impact and effectiveness, particularly in relation to 
human security and to addressing the needs and interests of poor and vulnerable groups;  
                                           
3
 There are numerous well-regarded regional and international guidelines relating to SALW control 
programmes, including for example Regional Micro-Disarmament Standard/Guideline (RMDS/G) 01.10. 
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 To examine issues and priorities for the future co-ordination and/or integration of   
DDR and SALW control programmes and processes.   
 
Our overall argument is that DDR and SALW control policies and programmes at need to 
be better co-ordinated in countries emerging from conflict, and in many contexts there are 
important opportunities for integrating aspects of DDR, SALW control and community 
security. The paper particularly links with Working Paper 2 in this series, on DDR-SSR 
linkages. Our wider argument is not simply to promote better bilateral coordination 
between DDR and SALW control and SSR respectively. Rather, it is to argue for a wider 
change in approach to support post-conflict security building, in which elements of DDR, 
SALW control, SSR and community security programmes are normally combined in a 
customised but relatively comprehensive effort to promote human security from violence 
and coercion.  
 
It is important to highlight some key themes and understandings of this working paper 
from the outset.  
A. We understand post-conflict peace and security building efforts to be highly 
challenging, uncertain and dynamic processes, in which understandings and priorities of 
both domestic and international stakeholders are inevitably partial and influenced by a 
complex of interests, capacities and resources. Even well-designed and implemented 
security-building programmes may not succeed. Enhanced clarity and co-ordination on 
key linkages between DDR and SALW control programmes and processes are no 
panacea; but they could nevertheless make a significant difference to many vulnerable 
people.  
B. The integration/coordination of DDR and SALW control programmes should not be 
seen as an „either/or‟ question (either they are fully integrated, fully coordinated, or not at 
all). This is because DDR and SALW control programmes are not monolithic objects but 
dynamic processes each with many components. It is more productive to clarify key 
linkages between the various components of DDR and SALW control at various phases 
of the post-conflict recovery process. For each of the linkages between programme 
components, integration/coordination agendas can thus range from full integration, 
through all sorts of partial integration, „positive‟ and „preventive‟ coordination (to 
maximise synergies and minimise contradictions) to no coordination.  
C. We are NOT arguing to further expand the scope of DDR programmes so that 
SALW control is fully integrated within them. We are sympathetic to the concerns of 
practitioners that DDR programmes should remain focussed, and that effective 
implementation of key aspects of SALW control policies and activities requires 
capabilities, scope and timescales that go substantially beyond those of an integrated 
DDR programme. Rather, we are concerned with identifying the key interrelationships 
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and links between DDR and SALW control processes, to promote effective co-ordination 
and synergies and overall coherence of the post-conflict recovery and peace-building 
strategy.  
D. We recognise that recent and contemporary DDR and SALW control programmes 
typically aim not only to contribute to stabilisation and security of the relevant post-
conflict state (and its neighbours) but also to promote „human security‟ of vulnerable 
individuals and communities. Indeed, both „human security‟ and „state-security‟ concerns 
motivate most elements of DDR programmes in principle and practice, and SALW 
programmes in post-conflict countries are normally mostly focussed on reducing risks 
posed to ordinary people and communities of armed violence and insecurity. In many 
cases, enhanced clarity and co-ordination on DDR-SALW control linkages could 
straightforwardly promote both goals. Nevertheless, there are sometimes real or apparent 
tensions and confusions in DDR and other security programme decisions between human 
security and state security priorities and implications. We aim to identify and clarify these 
where they arise, to ensure that interests and needs of vulnerable groups are kept to the 
fore. This Working Paper prioritises linkages and co-ordination issues that are important 
for human security, particularly of poor and vulnerable groups of people.  
 
1.3  Processes, Linkages, Integration and Coordination: Clarifying Terms   
It is easy in principle to see a range of actual and potential linkages between DDR and 
SALW control programmes and processes, and we will use this term loosely and 
inclusively. However, it is important for analytical clarity to distinguish how we aim to 
use the terms „integration‟ and „coordination‟  in this paper, and also „programmes‟ and 
„processes‟. Programmes are those DDR or SALW control processes that are explicitly 
designed, approved and implemented as managed programmes. We distinguish these 
from wider processes of DDR or SALW control that may also include unplanned, 
spontaneous or ad-hoc activities. For example, some militias may disband on their own, 
and many ex-combatants may spontaneously return to their communities or migrate to 
cities outside of the context of a planned programme. Similarly, communities or sectors 
of the population may change their attitudes or activities relating to gun possession, 
display or use outside of the context of a declared SALW control programmes. The same 
distinctions apply to any other post-conflict spheres of policy and programming. 
 
Typically, a DDR or SALW control process in a society includes a combination of 
programmatic and ad-hoc or informal activities.  Sometimes the process can occur before 
or without a recognised strategy or programme approved by relevant policy-makers. 
Obviously a well designed or implemented programme aims to link and re-enforce 
beneficial informal or societal normative changes or activities.  
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Just as policy-makers and programme implementers should try to think clearly about the 
interrelationships between their policies and programmes and wider societal processes, it 
is important for this Working Paper to distinguish interactions between DDR and SALW 
control programmes from links between DDR programmes and wider processes affecting 
SALW.  
 
It is similarly important to distinguish between programme co-ordination and integration. 
We understand policy or programme co-ordination to relate to efforts to recognise, 
communicate and use linkages between distinct policies and programmes in order to 
avoid confusion or inefficiency; exploit possible synergies; and to enhance overall 
effectiveness and coherence. The key point is that the relevant programmes to be co-
ordinated remain distinct entities. In contrast, integration of programmes goes beyond 
co-ordination, and implies that they are merged in some way into a single larger 
integrated programme. „DDR‟ is conceived as an integrated (rather than co-ordinated) set 
of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration measures. Full integration of DDR and 
SALW control would thus imply either that SALW control had become a subset of the 
overall DDR process (or vice versa), or that they had been fused together to form a new 
programmatic discipline.   
 
In practice, the distinctions between co-ordinated and integrated programmes are often 
blurred. Moreover, declared „integrated programmes‟ can often actually be rather un-
integrated or even un-co-ordinated. For example, in many DDR programmes, longer-term 
measures to re-integrate ex-combatants into civilian life have often been relatively 
divorced from the disarmament and demobilisation (including „re-insertion‟) measures. 
However, the distinction is important for clarity of analysis. It is also important to avoid 
raising unnecessary sensitivities amongst policy makers and practitioners, since such 
distinctions have major implications for them institutionally and politically, and in 
relation to resources, responsibilities, decision-making and status/careers.  
 
Partial integration is possible where elements of distinct wider programmes are merged. 
For example, a specific SALW control measure might be integrated into a DDR 
programme while all other SALW control measures remain distinct. Issues of phasing 
can arise in this context. Elements of programmes integrated at the design and initiation 
phase may become relatively independent programmes over time. More rarely in post-
conflict contexts, separate programmes may be merged as a result of a mid-term review, 
to overcome critical co-ordination or management problems.  
 
1.4  Organisation of the Working Paper 
The purpose of Sections 2-4 is to place the practical question of how to better 
coordinate/integrate DDR and SALW control in an appropriate framework and context. 
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They seek to ensure that the nature of both activities is well understood, that the potential 
points of intersection or tension are identified, and that the benefits and pitfalls of 
enhanced coordination/integration are explored. Section 2 briefly defines and 
characterises DDR and SALW control priorities and programmes in post-conflict 
contexts. Section 3 starts by outlining the potential benefits and risks of attempting to 
increase integration or coordination between DDR and SALW control, placing this in the 
context of human security and pro-poor policies. It then goes on to map the opportunities 
for integration and/or coordination by exploring the commonalities and differences 
between DDR and SALW control and highlighting areas where integration/coordination 
could in principle be achieved. This is followed in Section 4 by an assessment of 
experience: how DDR and SALW control programmes have been linked or co-ordinated 
in practice and the impact this has had. The research draws both on general data about 
recent post-conflict operations across the world and on the initial findings of some in-
depth case studies carried out within the overall project. Section 5 the draws together the 
main findings and discussed emerging policy implications.  
 
2. Understanding DDR and SALW control programmes: some 
definitions and key characteristics 
 
Section 2 provides some working definitions and understandings of DDR and SALW 
control as a basis for subsequent analysis.  
 
2.1 DDR: Definitions and key characteristics  
Classically, DDR is made up of at least three reasonably distinct activities: disarmament, 
demobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants. More recently, the demobilisation 
phase has been subdivided, to include re-insertion of ex-combatants into civilian life, by 
providing transitional assistance to bridge the gap before longer-term re-integration.
4
 
Taken separately, each of these processes may occur in a variety of contexts, from the 
end of compulsory military service during peacetime through to the downsizing of forces 
as part of SSR.
5
  However, during the 1990s international commitment was developed for 
the concept of an integrated „DDR‟ package of measures to be implemented after wars 
come to an end.  
 
Box 2.1 Elements of DDR 
Disarmament: the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of (ex-)combatants. Disarmament 
                                           
4
 Full definitions for demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration can be found in IDDRS Module 1.20; the 
IDDRS definition for disarmament is discussed below. 
5
 Rufer, 2005, pp. 2-3. 
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may also include the development of responsible and effective arms management 
programmes. 
Demobilisation: the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed 
forces and other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the 
processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in 
camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or 
barracks). The second stage encompasses the support package provided to the 
demobilised, which is called „re-insertion‟. 
Re-insertion: the short-term (up to about one year) material and/or financial assistance 
offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation but prior to the longer term process of re-
integration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help to cover the basic 
needs of ex-combatants and their families and other dependants, and can include 
transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term 
education, training, employment and tools.  
 Reintegration: the longer-term social, political and economic process by which ex-
combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. 
Reintegration is an open time-framed complex process, primarily taking place in 
communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country, and is a 
national responsibility which often requires long-term external assistance.  
Note: these definitions broadly follow those of the UN IDDRS, with some editing for 
clarity and brevity. 
 
The UN IDDRS define the objectives of DDR to be: „A process that contributes to 
security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the 
hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to 
integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods.‟6  
 
The scope and ambition of DDR makes it complex both in terms of its goals and its 
interaction with other processes. The IDDRS emphasises that „the DDR of ex-combatants 
is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic 
dimensions.‟7 SIDDR underlines that as a key part of the peace process, DDR is a highly 
political endeavour,
8
 and Rufer notes that DDR is „both the means (disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration as technical and political instruments) of the peace 
process and its end (demobilised ex-combatants who have definitely stopped using their 
weapons, are integrated in civilian life and participate productively in the civilian 
                                           
6
 Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) Module 1.20, p. 6.  
7
 IDDRS Module 2.10, p. 4. 
8
 SIDDR Final Report, 2006, p. 9. 
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economy)‟.9 Furthermore, it is clearly recognised that DDR is but one element of post-
conflict security and peace-building measures, alongside possible peacekeeping 
operations, SALW control, SSR, transitional justice, and mine action.  
 
Reintegration is a relatively long term and open social, economic and political process. 
To be successful, it must be part of a wider long-term strategy to rebuild and develop the 
country in such a way that peace is sustainable. As a result, there has been a tendency to 
push DDR policy and programme boundaries ever further, at the risk of saddling DDR 
programmes with unrealistic expectations.  
 
This has been compounded by the characteristics of the funding and donor system. DDR 
programmes are high-profile interventions, agreed and implemented as the transition 
from conflict to peace is just beginning. Internationally supported DDR programmes have 
normally attracted comparatively high levels of funding (compared to wider SALW 
control). In the context of UN missions, for example, UN Assessed Contributions can be 
used to support integrated DDR and wider peace-support missions. Later, when it comes 
to the hard task of long-term, sustainable re-integration and peacebuilding, international 
and donor attention has typically shifted to other crises, co-ordination measures became 
(even) less influential, and mechanisms for mobilising international aid become more 
fragmented and ad-hoc. As a result, advocates of longer-term security and development 
measures can find it much harder to win the resources they believe necessary. This 
creates a temptation to „attach‟ their initiatives to the DDR framework in an attempt to 
secure earlier and increased resources. 
 
Such factors have in recent years led to widespread concerns amongst policy makers and 
practitioners to retain focus in DDR programmes. For example, the SIDDR 
recommended a return to the chief purpose of DDR:  „to contribute to a secure and stable 
environment in which the overall peace process and transition can be sustained [by] 
removing the immediate threat to a fragile peace posed by groups of armed, uncontrolled 
and unemployed ex-combatants‟; 10  noting that DDR programmes should be  „based on 
the goals of security and stability [and cannot] alone […] achieve either a rapid or 
comprehensive transformation of societal structures‟.11  
 
2.2 Understanding disarmament within DDR 
An obvious key linkage between DDR and SALW control is in the area of disarmament. 
Disarmament is defined in the IDDRS as follows: 
                                           
9
 Rufer, 2005, p. 23. 
10
 SIDDR Final Report, 2006, p. 14. 
11
 SIDDR Final Report pp. 14-15.  
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Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often 
also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of 
responsible arms management programmes.
12
 
 
This definition emphasises that the primary role of disarmament within DDR is to disarm 
combatants who are being demobilised in the immediate post-conflict period. But it also 
acknowledges two wider dimensions: that normally it is also desirable and necessary to 
reduce as well as control the weapons held by the civilian population; and that short-term 
disarmament measures must be linked to longer-term SALW control, which goes far 
beyond simple disarmament (see Section 2.3 below).   
 
In order to achieve DDR, different strategies may be required for various elements, 
including the employment of both short- and long-term disarmament strategies: 
 
The removal of weapons from combatants is only one aspect of disarmament within 
DDR. A broad range of short- and long-term activities should accompany this 
process, including: community-based weapons collection and control programmes; 
weapons destruction; the (re-)establishment of domestic legal systems to control 
weapons possession, regulate local weapons production industries, and manage the 
supply and transportation of weapons; and securing State stockpiles to prevent 
leakage of arms into society. External measures such as international and regional 
small arms and light weapons conventions and arms embargoes must be used to 
devise cooperative regional strategies to control the flow of illicit weapons across 
borders.
 13
 
 
There is thus a significant overlap in the IDDRS with the definition and scope of DDR 
and SALW control measures (see below). This appears to reflect an unresolved (and 
fudged) debate amongst DDR policy-makers and practitioners about DDR-SALW control 
linkages. There is clearly an important and practical distinction between the „core‟ DDR 
business of disarmament of ex-combatants (and their dependents) and the range of wider 
„arms management and control‟ programmes. But, since several recent UN „DDR‟ 
programmes (such as in South Sudan and Haiti) have in practice aimed to support wider 
arms management, they could hardly be excluded in the IDDRS definition. We 
understand examples of wider practice in some recent DDR programmes to be examples 
of well-intentioned efforts by programme managers to respond to major gaps in mandated 
                                           
12
 IDDRS Module 1.20, p. 6; Secretary-General note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005. 
13
 IDDRS Module 2.10, p. 5. 
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post-conflict security-building missions by extending their own programmes into wider 
SALW control.  Moreover, in many war-torn countries, there is no clear distinction in 
practice between armies, armed groups and civilians. 
 
For reasons of analytical clarity, for the purposes of this Working Paper our definition of 
the disarmament element of DDR (see Box 2.1 above) omits or limits reference to wider 
civilian disarmament and arms management. We believe that our approach is consistent 
with the overall thrust of the IDDRS, which in other sections makes it clear that the range 
of short- and long-term disarmament strategies described by the IDDRS are a list of 
possibilities and are not necessarily an integral part of DDR. In this regard, it is worth 
noting the approach taken by the EU. The EU‟s „Concept for support to Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration‟ adopts the UN definitions for DDR in full, but the 
definition of disarmament is qualified by a footnote stating that the development of 
responsible arms management programmes is „not mandatory‟, though it should be noted 
that „disarmament is often linked to civilian voluntary surrender programmes.‟14 
 
2.3 SALW control: Definitions and key characteristics
15
 
The issue of SALW proliferation has rapidly risen up the international agenda since the 
mid-1990s, due to a range of factors including wider recognition of the terrible impacts of 
inadequately controlled or misused SALW in much of the world, and the challenges these 
pose for post-conflict peace-building. The size, portability and easy operation of pistols, 
assault rifles and many other SALW makes them easy to conceal and to smuggle, and 
they are usually relatively cheap and readily available. They are typically held by many 
sectors beyond the military, including civilians, police and other civilian agencies, and 
private security companies - causing serious problems of armed violence and insecurity 
in many politically stable or relatively peaceful countries. They are also the primary 
weapons of use in the majority of the world‟s armed conflicts. During recent wars, large 
numbers of SALW typically diffused throughout major sections of society, and were used 
not only in war but also for wider crime, intimidation and personal protection. Their wide 
and excessive availability after large-scale conflict ends tend to exacerbate violent crime 
and human insecurity, as well as obstructing state stabilisation and post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
 
There are numerous descriptions of the category of „SALW‟, but no globally agreed 
definition. This paper will use perhaps the most widely used understanding of the SALW 
                                           
14
 EU Concept for Support to DDR, 2006, p.7 
15
 This paper uses the term „SALW control‟, which is increasingly recognised as the preferred terminology 
for this field of activity. However, references may also be found to „arms management‟ and „micro-
disarmament‟ in the text where they quote from other sources. These are similar terms but are less 
conceptually distinct and do not have such a body of policy and practice behind them as „SALW control‟. 
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category, which has informed the UN Programme of Action and most national policies 
and regional agreements on SALW. According to this understanding
16
, SALW are: Small 
Arms – all conventional weapons that can be carried and operated by a single individual, 
including: revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; assault rifles; grenades; 
sub-machine guns; and light machine guns. Light Weapons – conventional weapons that 
can be carried and operated by a small unit of 2 – 4 personnel and could, for example, be 
mounted on the back of a jeep. These include: heavy machine guns; hand-held under-
barrel and mounted grenade launchers; recoilless rifles; portable anti-tank and anti-
aircraft guns; portable anti-tank or anti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars of less than 
100 mm calibre. More briefly, as adopted by the UNDP South Eastern and East European 
Clearinghouse for the Control of Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) 
in the Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards/Guidelines (RMDS/G), 
17
 SALW are: 
 
All lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a 
light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance 
capability.
18
 
 
In principle, anti-personnel land-mines are also included in this category, but they are 
normally placed in a category of their own since they are the focus of separate 
international agreements and programmes. For this reason, this Paper does not focus on 
land mines. However, it is important to recognise that programmes to clear land of mines 
and to dispose of land mines often overlap in practice with SALW reduction and control 
processes. Mines and SALW are often mixed in the holdings of armed groups, and thus 
collection and disposal programmes need at least to be co-ordinated, and in practice they 
are often integrated. For example, there are many cases where land-mine disposal 
programmes have also dealt with SALW and unexploded ordinance as well. Measures to 
promote arms stockpile management and security must tackle both mines and SALW in 
practice. More widely, it makes sense for co-operation between land-mine, SALW 
collection and disposal, and disarmament elements of DDR programmes that are 
operating in the same geographical areas.  
 
SALW control programmes can be defined for our purposes as „activities that, together, 
aim to enhance controls on SALW and to reduce the social, economic and environmental 
                                           
16
 Reports of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts (1997) and of the UN Group of Governmental Experts 
(1999); UNGA, 1997; 1999. 
17
 As explained in RMDS/G 01.10, the term „micro-disarmament‟ was often used previously for activities 
that are broadly synonymous to those contained within SALW control. „SALW control‟ is now the most 
commonly used term (see previous footnote), but the RMDS/G have not been renamed as they are already 
established standards. 
18
 RMDS/G 02.10, p. 20 
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impact of inadequately controlled SALW spread and possession‟.19 Unlike DDR, SALW 
control is relevant in all country contexts, including politically stable countries or fragile 
states as well as war-torn societies. SALW control measures go far beyond the 
disarmament phase within DDR. Although disarmament within DDR in itself obviously 
includes SALW control measures, it is a specific intervention primarily focussed on 
recognised ex-combatants (and their dependents) and is far narrower in scope than 
SALW control. To facilitate analytical clarity, in this Working Paper „SALW control‟ is 
taken to mean those SALW control measures other than disarmament within DDR, 
unless specifically stated.  
 
SALW control includes a wide range of types of measures. For example, the RMDS/G 
identify eight types of SALW control:  
 Cross-border and arms transfer control measures;  
 Legislative and regulatory measures;  
 SALW surveys;  
 SALW awareness and communications strategies;  
 SALW collection programmes;  
 SALW destruction programmes;  
 Management of information;  
 SALW stockpile management and security.20  
 
The past ten years have seen the rapid development of global and regional agreements 
with norms, standards and programmes to enhance SALW controls and to combat, reduce 
and prevent proliferation and trafficking of SALW. There is now substantial 
programming experience, and detailed best practice guidelines for policy development 
and the programme implementation have also been developed, particularly at the regional 
level.
 
For example, the RMDS developed under the auspices of SEESAC provide a 
relatively extensive and systematic set of implementation guidelines for SALW control 
measures, covering issues from operational practices in weapons collection to legislative 
issues and the establishment of institutional structures.
21
 Detailed best practice guidelines 
have also been developed by the OSCE and under the auspices of RECSA, in East Africa, 
while model legal frameworks for SALW control have been developed within the OAS, 
League of Arab States and Pacific Islands Forum.
22
  
                                           
19
 Adapted from, IDDRS Module 1.20, p.21; RMDS/G 02.10, p. 20. 
20
 RMDS/G 01.10, p.4. Other UN definitions appear to list only six component parts by grouping together 
some of these activities, such as collection and destruction operations. 
21
 See SEESAC RMDS http://www.seesac.org/index.php?content=&page=crse&section=5 
22
 See: OSCE, Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OSCE, Vienna, 2003; 
RECSA, „Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi 
Protocol‟, RECSA, Nairobi, 2005; Arab Model Law on Weapons, Ammuntions, Explosives and Hazardous 
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The translation of these international and regional commitments and guidelines into more 
tangible programmes and projects has been uneven, both in terms of where programmes 
have been developed and in the issues of SALW control on which these programmes 
focus. Nonetheless, within regions such as East, West and Southern Africa; South Eastern 
and Eastern Europe; Latin America; South Pacific; and parts of South East Asia, well-
established regional SALW programmes are now in place, with active regional co-
ordination bodies in operation.
23
 A growing number of states have established national 
commissions, or focal points – inter-agency bodies to co-ordinate policy and action on 
SALW control. While many have yet to become fully operational, there are a growing 
number of broad-ranging national SALW control programmes, such as the National 
Action Plans being implemented in Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Botswana and Namibia, 
and programmes like the EU-sponsored ASAC project in Cambodia, among others.
24
 
Through the experiences of programmes such as these, there have been rapid 
improvements in international understanding of the purposes, methodologies and 
complexities of SALW control. 
 
This outline of SALW control measures underlines the variety as well as the complexity 
of SALW reduction and control as a field of policy and practice. SALW control has far 
wider scope than disarmament or weapons collection. Indeed, in some circumstances it 
may be deemed infeasible or even harmful to political or conflict dynamics to attempt 
disarmament. In such contexts other types of SALW control should be prioritised, such as 
measures to raise awareness; reduce the risk of SALW being misused and fuelling crime 
and insecurity; improve laws and regulations; enhance SALW stockpile security; or 
improve controls on legal or illicit SALW transfers.  
 
                                                                                                                             
Materials (Full text available at http://www.international.gc.ca/informalmeetinggeneva2007/arab-model-
law-en.asp (Unofficial English translation), OAS CICAD Draft Model Regulations for the Control of 
Brokers of Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition. Amendments to the Model Regulation 
for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, 
2003 (http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cicad_brokers.pdf); Pacific Islands Forum, „Weapons Control 
Bill‟ (http://www.globalpolicy.org/smallarms/regional/nadi.rtf). 
23
 Regional Centre of Small Arms (formerly the Nairobi Secretariat) has operated since 2003, facilitating 
the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol and enabling co-operation among the signatory states to the 
Protocol. In South Eastern and Eastern Europe, the UNDP SEESAC has been providing support to the 
establishment of SALW control programmes since 2003. 
24
 For further information reviewing progress made in the implementation of regional and international 
commitments and reviews of SALW programmes see, IANSA and Biting the Bullet, Reviewing action on 
small arms: assessing the first five years of the UN Programme of Action, Biting the Bullet, June 2006, 
(http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php?id=191) SEESAC SALW Monitor Reports 
(http://www.seesac.org/index.php?content=13&section=3 and, Small Arms Survey Yearbooks 
(http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/yearb2007.html 
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Successful SALW control normally depends on the combination of several of its 
programme elements, rather than implementing any one element in isolation. Moreover, 
it is widely acknowledged that even comprehensive SALW control programmes are 
unlikely to be effective unless they are placed within a wider security context. SALW 
control measures typically need to be complemented with measures to address the 
insecurities that help to generate demand for weapons as well as wider political, socio-
economic, cultural and other factors that contribute to criminal or political violence. 
Thus, for example, SALW control programmes are increasingly linked with programmes 
to promote community engagement and with SSR initiatives such as police or judicial 
reform aimed at improving human security and community safety.
25
  
 
This Working Paper specifically examines links between DDR and SALW 
reduction/control processes, and thus focuses on SALW control in post-conflict 
environments. SALW control is typically very relevant after large scale armed conflicts, 
where SALW remain widely available amongst civilians and armed groups other than 
recognised ex-combatants, and where risks of misuse are typically high. It is now widely 
recognised that SALW control measures (in conjunction with related SSR and 
community safety initiatives) can potentially play a crucial role in promoting human 
security as well as state stabilisation throughout the post-conflict transition and peace-
building period, including the early stages. The IDDRS module entitled „SALW Control, 
Security and Development‟ states succinctly that „in post-conflict situations, where 
weapons are often widely held by ex-combatants, civilians and criminals, the presence of 
SALW can severely hamper security, undermining the prospects of longer-term recovery 
and development.‟26 
 
Without effective action to promote SALW controls, the consequences for human 
security as well as state stabilisation can be severe: 
 There is a greater chance of a relapse into armed conflict. Evidence shows that 
post-conflict countries are particularly vulnerable to the re-emergence of armed 
conflict.
27
 While arms do not in themselves cause renewed conflict, high levels of arms 
availability increase the risk that disaffected groups resort to armed violence; either as a 
resumption of past conflict or in new formations.  
                                           
25
 UNDP Practice Note “Securing Development”, 2005, p. 10. This is also evidenced at the national level, 
where the National Action Plans adopted by Kenya and Uganda, for instance, under Section 7.3 of these 
plans, make explicit reference to the co-ordination of SALW programmes with community-based policing 
initiatives. See Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons, “Mapping the Small 
Arms Problem in Uganda: The development of Uganda‟s National Action Plan on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons”, Saferworld, 2007, p. 68-69. 
26
 IDDRS Module 4.11, p. 1. 
27
 See, for example, P.Collier and N. Sambaris (eds), Understanding Civil War; The World Bank, 2005. 
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 SALW can fuel high levels of post-conflict armed criminal violence and 
insecurity, greatly affecting ordinary people and communities through the direct and 
indirect impacts of armed violence and insecurity. In various „post-conflict‟ situations, 
such as El Salvador, Haiti, and Iraq, overall levels of armed criminal violence have been 
comparable to those during the war. This will typically relate to combinations of score-
settling, land and property disputes/theft, warlordism, raiding, street crime, organised 
crime, domestic violence, sexual violence, and suicide; as well as new forms of political 
violence as interest groups pursue their interests in the new „post-conflict‟ environment.  
 Refugee and IDP camps are more vulnerable to armed groups. There is often a 
struggle to control such camps after as well as during conflicts – to hide, regroup and 
gain access to humanitarian resources. Wide availability of SALW can affect the risks 
and impacts of such struggles. 
 Excessive holdings of SALW can fuel internal or cross-border arms transfers. 
Weapons that are rendered surplus in the post-conflict period become available as a 
commodity for uncontrolled internal or cross-border trade, if they are not collected and 
safely disposed of. There are many examples of destabilising flows of SALW to rebels or 
criminals in neighbouring countries and regions as conflicts come to an end.   
 SALW availability increases the risk that armed violence becomes a political or 
cultural norm. Widespread (mis-)use of SALW and other weapons during conflicts 
disrupts previous social regulation and control of violence; and a „culture of violence‟ 
and impunity can take hold. Wide availability of SALW increases the risk that these 
endure in the post conflict period; with high levels of gun possession, armed violence and 
insecurity becoming a norm, particularly affecting vulnerable people and communities.   
 Missed opportunities to break vicious cycles. When armed conflicts come to an end, 
there are often „windows of opportunity‟ for confidence-building and reducing SALW 
availability. Ordinary people hope for the best and armed groups know that they may 
have to change. This provides a context in which well-designed and timely practical 
initiatives can stimulate a positive dynamic to promote human security and empowerment 
of communities. Experience indicates that SALW collection or destruction initiatives can 
constitute an important practical and symbolic entry-point for such confidence-building, 
while also helping to remove significant numbers of „surplus‟ arms from circulation.28 
Delayed action on SALW control risks missing such windows of opportunity, and 
allowing a malign cycle to take hold in which civilian demand for SALW is re-enforced 
by lowered expectations of enduring insecurity from armed criminal or political violence 
in the post-conflict environment.   
                                           
28
 See CICS, AVPI report, 2005, op cit. Note that such early SALW collection and destruction initiatives do 
not normally succeed in collecting arms that their owners believe to be essential for their security. Rather 
they reduce overall arms availability by collecting the arms that are becoming surplus to „essential‟ 
requirements – normally substantial quantities, as well as often encouraging people to hide their remaining 
weapons and thus reducing display and ready access to these as well.   
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The threats posed by uncontrolled SALW to human security from violence after conflicts 
are thus clearly established. SALW control programmes can also make an important 
contribution to wider poverty reduction, recovery and development, even though these 
are not usually set as a declared programme objective.
29
 The EU SALW Strategy 
recognises that „the destabilizing accumulation and spread of SALW constitutes a 
growing threat to peace, security and development‟ and that „human security and human 
development are interdependent‟.30 SALW programmes can help not only by reducing 
the direct scale and risks of armed violence, but also improving perceptions of security, 
which can be even more important in promoting an environment for development and 
wider peace-building to take place. A study on SALW programmes within Bradford 
University‟s Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative found that in Sierra Leone, for 
example, „women and men were able to return to farming land that was lost during the 
war as a result of the reduction of armed violence measured by members of the 
community in terms of less frequent incidences of gun shot sounds. This had a clear 
impact on poverty reduction in rural Sierra Leone.‟31 Similarly, a UNDP SALW „arms 
for development‟ programme involving the establishment of gun-free zones had notable 
impacts on rural participation in primary education and health, as well as in bringing 
good to markets: the absence of gunfire (even from hunting) built confidence in safe 
travel for all along rural tracks. As noted above, SALW programmes also facilitate 
development by promoting ideas such as community ownership and empowerment that 
can then be translated into other spheres. 
 
2.4  Conclusion 
Both DDR and SALW control programmes are highly relevant in most, if not all, post-
conflict contexts. Having outlined the key aims, understandings, and elements of each of 
these two types of security-building programmes, it is clear that there are some potential 
overlaps and also that linkages between DDR and SALW control programmes and 
processes can be expected to be important – for each programme and for the overall 
impact on the poor and vulnerable.   
 
Recognition of the importance of DDR programmes in post-conflict support missions has 
been internationally- recognised at least since the early 1990s. Similar recognition of the 
likely importance of early SALW control measures has only recently developed, and is 
still patchy. In most post-conflict support programmes to date, wider SALW control 
                                           
29
 CICS (Centre for International Co-operation and Security), University of Bradford; „Armed Violence and 
Poverty Initiative Research project, 2005; (a major project, resulting in over 20 research reports relating to 
this issue): see www.brad.ac.uk/peace/cics/avpi 
30
 EU SALW Strategy, p. 7 & p. 3. 
31
 CICS University of Bradford, “Assessing and reviewing the impact of SALW projects”, 2005, p. 5. 
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measures have either been delayed until long after DDR programmes have been 
launched, or not conducted at all. In such circumstances, there has typically been a 
security programme „gap‟ between demobilisation and disarmament of ex-combatants in 
DDR programmes in the immediate post-conflict period and the wider establishment of 
human security for vulnerable people and communities. The security of such vulnerable 
groups is affected by the availability and use of weapons across the whole society and 
territory, and not only those held by the official combatants addressed in the DDR 
programme.  
Gaps or inadequate linkages between DDR and SALW control measures not only 
threaten wider prospects for stabilisation and human security but also the viability and 
effectiveness of each of each programme in itself. For example, ex-combatants are highly 
sensitive to likely insecurities associated with their re-insertion and re-integration into 
civilian life. High levels of human insecurity in communities, and lack of action on 
SALW and community safety, may discourage ex-combatants from disarming properly 
or from leaving their old command structures – thus undermining the effectiveness of 
DDR programmes. Similarly, efforts to promote small arms control and reduction 
amongst civilians are greatly limited if there are not corresponding programmes relating 
to the military, police and armed militias.  
 
3. Linkages between DDR and SALW Programmes: Issues and 
Priorities  
 
3.1  Introduction 
This section aims to examine the linkages between DDR and SALW control programmes 
and processes in post-conflict contexts, and to provide an initial mapping of the issues 
and priorities for possible co-ordination or integration. In line with the overall aims of 
this Working Paper, it focuses particularly on linkages and issues relating to the interests 
and concerns of the poor and vulnerable after armed conflicts, although it is important to 
note that these are often intimately related to progress in sustaining the peace settlement 
and state stabilisation. Although the discussion draws upon practical experience in many 
post-conflict countries, the focus is on providing an initial mapping of the issues for 
possible co-ordination or integration rather than specific examination of country 
experiences (for which, see section 4).  
 
3.2.  Programme co-ordination or integration: risks and benefits  
It is important to recognise that efforts to co-ordinate or integrate programmes for 
complex and challenging post-conflict environments have often proved frustrating, 
resource and time intensive. It is not always clear that the resulting improvements in 
overall effectiveness justified the effort, and in some cases they may be a costly 
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diversion. Thus it is important to go beyond identifying programme linkages and 
potential overlaps to establish priorities for co-ordination/integration – where the pay-offs 
are likely to justify the effort. To help to ensure consistent awareness from the outset of 
the key potential risks as well as benefits of co-ordination efforts, we briefly outline them 
here.  
  
3.2.1 Possible drawbacks of integration/coordination efforts 
There are a number of potential pitfalls for efforts to co-ordinate or integrate DDR and 
SALW control programmes and measures:  
 Confusion of objectives. Post-conflict environments are highly complex, challenging 
and uncertain. The scope of SALW control is not only distinct but also in principle much 
wider than that of DDR: in terms of issues, capabilities, target groups/beneficiaries, 
stakeholders, and processes. If DDR programme design and implementation becomes 
closely entangled with wider SALW control measures, it may not only distract from 
„core‟ DDR measures but also lead to wider confusion of objectives between different 
programme elements. Blurred objectives will further complicate monitoring and 
evaluation and reduce the accountability of implementing agencies. 
 Overloading design and planning stages. Despite recent increased international 
attention and resources allocated to comprehensive and integrated post-conflict mission 
assessments and programme design and planning, these processes remain severely 
constrained in terms of time, resources, uncertainty and political complexity. 
Requirements for on-going close co-ordination or integration between DDR and SALW 
controls (or other types of programmes) could delay or overload urgent design and 
planning for core DDR programme elements, exacerbated by the fact that the practitioner 
communities for DDR and SALW control are often relatively distinct, with different 
institutional backgrounds and understandings of good practices.  
 Mixed messages sent to beneficiaries and stakeholders. Since DDR and SALW 
control have overlapping but different target groups, beneficiaries and objectives, there is 
a substantial risk of mixed messages being received by various stakeholders. While 
experienced international staff may understand the distinctions between each strand of 
programme activity, they may be less clear to national decision-makers or to civilian, and 
ex-combatant communities. Such confusions can be particularly damaging in post-
conflict countries 
 Operational risks from confusion among the civilian population. The confusions 
noted above could put programme elements at risk. For example, the IDDRS notes a 
number of risks if target groups confuse concurrent programmes for D&D of ex-
combatants and voluntary civilian weapons collection. For example, there may be 
misperceptions between civilians and ex-combatants about incentive packages or the 
extent to which weapons hand-in is voluntary. Similarly, civilians may try to surrender 
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weapons and ordnance at collection points designed for ex-combatants (and vice versa), 
resulting in safety problems and mix-ups with record-keeping, cantonment and re-
insertion, and individuals‟ status in the overall DDR programme. Such confusions can 
result in tension and violence, as illustrated by practical experience (such as in Liberia), 
and can be exploited by „spoilers‟.  
 Loss of flexibility. It is important for post-conflict programmes to retain appropriate 
flexibility to respond to emerging implementation problems or changes in context. 
Additional requirements to maintain co-ordination (or integration) of programmes raise 
further obstacles to responsiveness and adaptability of each programme or programme 
element.  
 Risk of unsustainable close co-ordination: distinctive but co-ordinated programmes 
are relatively vulnerable to failures of co-ordination during implementation, even if co-
ordination has been good during the initial design and planning stages. The existence of 
distinct decision-making, funding and resources, institutions, and implementation teams 
whose primary responsibility is to their own programme makes co-ordination prone to 
disruption – particularly in the complex and politicised post-conflict context. If one 
programme has been designed to rely on such co-ordination, the consequences of such 
disruptions can be serious. In this sense, close co-ordination risks being an unsustainable 
half-way house between mere information exchange and consultation on the one hand 
and integration on the other.   
 
Such risks vary according to whether programme co-ordination or full or partial 
integration is on the agenda. As illustrated in the last point, the integration option can in 
some cases be seen as a possible solution to mitigate risks arising from attempts at close 
co-ordination. Similarly, in other respects, co-ordination strategies may appear to pose 
lower risks than integration (in relation for example to flexibility).  
 
3.2.2  Potential benefits of improved integration/coordination 
The potential benefits of enhanced co-ordination or integration of DDR and SALW 
control programmes should be assessed alongside such risks. The overall direction of 
recent international policies and lessons from experience of post-conflict peace and 
security building has been towards enabling and enhancing programme co-ordination and 
integration – not least through the UN‟s „integrated mission‟ agenda. The IDDRS and 
many other authoritative sources have emphasised the importance of promoting effective 
co-ordination of DDR with other post-conflict programmes including SALW control.  
 
The potential benefits of co-ordination or integration of programmes are broadly to 
recognise and develop synergies and avoid undesirable duplication, gaps or 
contradictions between the programmes. More specifically, benefits include the 
following. 
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 Recognise that DDR and SALW control programmes should be elements of a 
more comprehensive process of post-conflict reconstruction and peace and security 
building. In this context, co-ordination or integration of DDR and SALW control 
programmes is important as part of a wider priority to co-ordinate all efforts in line with 
an overall peace-building strategy. This is important at the design and planning stages, as 
well as during implementation and review. 
 Promote efficient use of resources. Where elements of DDR and SALW control 
require similar information, interact with similar stakeholders, make use of similar skills, 
capacities and equipment, etc, co-ordination or integration can help to pool resources and 
avoid duplication.  
 Promote effective use of information. Formal and informal gathering and assessment 
of information on progress towards implementation and objectives, and emerging 
problems and opportunities, are vital for effective DDR and SALW control programmes 
and processes. Programme co-ordination or integration can facilitate sharing of 
information, assessments and responses to mutual benefit. 
 Prevent mixed messages and confusion amongst beneficiaries and stakeholders. 
The potential for confusion amongst local and national stakeholders between DDR and 
SALW control elements is intrinsic to post-conflict programmes, and may be more 
effectively addressed through co-ordinated approaches than by emphasising the distance 
between programmes.  
 Manage overlapping mandates and objectives. The mandates and overall objectives 
established for international DDR or SALW control programmes are often the result of 
political compromise, and may be vague, over-restrictive, or out of date. Co-ordination 
between programmes may be required to identify and jointly address gaps, overlaps, and 
inconsistencies in mandates and objectives in the interests of human security as well as of 
state stabilisation. Instead of leading to confusion about objectives, as sceptics fear, co-
ordination can help to clarify and refine appropriate and balanced objectives within and 
between programmes. Co-ordination facilitates appropriate sequencing and phasing, as 
well as concurrent programming. 
 Enable joint problem solving. Armed violence, insecurity, the continuing existence 
of armed groups, and difficulties reintegrating ex-combatants often fall within the same 
vicious circles. Success in DDR and SALW control may depend on tackling obstacles in 
a co-ordinated way, taking advantage of the differing capacities and constituencies of the 
two programmes.  
 Promote awareness in DDR programmes of interests of the poor and vulnerable 
people. DDR programmes broadly tend to focus on engaging with the main armed 
groups, and on the concerns of their leaders and ex-combatants, in order to support and 
maintain the peace settlement and stabilise the state and government. In contrast, SALW 
control programmes tend primarily to focus more directly on reducing risks of armed 
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violence to ordinary civilians, and on engaging with wider governmental and community 
groups. Co-ordination (or integration) between them may help to ensure that 
opportunities are taken for DDR to contribute to wider security of vulnerable people.  
 Promote links between short and longer term post-conflict security-building. 
Typically, DDR programmes are designed and launched as soon as possible after large-
scale conflict ends, and most programme elements are terminated after 2-4 years. In 
contrast, SALW control programmes are mostly initiated after any DDR programme has 
started, and may focus on longer-term security-building. Co-ordination between them 
may improve: consideration of longer-term issues in DDR programming; and continuity 
and hand-over as DDR programmes come to an end.  
 Enable capacity built during DDR to be carried on to SALW control 
programmes. When DDR programmes finish, much of the technical, human, 
institutional and physical capacity and knowledge that has been built up is withdrawn or 
dispersed. Co-ordination or integration could help to avoid such waste by enabling 
valuable hand-over to continuing SALW or other programmes.  
 
These are all important potential benefits from programmes co-ordination or integration. 
The next step is to identify and examine linkages between DDR and SALW control 
programmes in order to identify the areas and contexts where there is strong potential for 
realising such benefits and where they could make a big difference – for human security 
as well as state stabilisation. 
 
International guidance on such issues remains inadequate. In practice the IDDRS is vague 
or inconsistent about the circumstances in which integration or close co-ordination with 
wider SALW control is a priority.  In places, the IDDRS comes close to recommending a 
strongly integrationist approach – to the extent that its definition of disarmament within 
DDR includes „the development of responsible arms management programmes.‟ It 
further states that „DDR processes should deal very thoroughly with all aspects of 
disarmament and weapons control and management‟.32 However, as noted, at other 
points, the IDDRS approach is entirely consistent with a relatively minimalist „co-
ordination as necessary‟ approach. The following sub-sections aim to address these 
questions more specifically and systematically. 
 
3.3  DDR and SALW Control Programmes: Commonalities and Differences 
This sub-section aims to compare and contrast the main „macro-level‟ characteristics of 
DDR and SALW control programmes: what they aim to do (objectives, targets and 
beneficiaries); how they are managed (implementing actors, sources and scale of funding, 
characteristics of local ownership); when they are completed (phasing and sequencing of 
                                           
32
 IDDRS Module 2.10, p.4. 
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DDR and SALW control interventions); monitoring and assessments of effectiveness 
(monitoring, review and evaluation); and their links with other programmes and 
processes. This helps to structure and illuminate the discussion in section 3.4 of practical 
links and potential synergies between these two types of programme. 
 
3.3.1 Comparing Programme Aims and Objectives 
It is clear from section 2 of this Working Paper that there are many similarities between 
the overall objectives of DDR and SALW control programmes in post-conflict contexts. 
Thus: 
 The main aim of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-
conflict situations so that recovery and development can begin;
33
  
 The overriding aim of any SALW control intervention programme is to secure a safer 
environment and control small arms and light weapons within society - to promote the 
conditions that will encourage progress in enhancing human security across the country 
and its neighbours.
34
  
 
Both DDR and SALW control focus on reducing risks posed by arms and armed 
individuals and groups to society, the state and the region. They are thus both highly 
political processes, though with numerous technical dimensions that key stakeholders are 
sometimes prepared (conditionally) to de-politicise for pragmatic reasons. 
 DDR programmes primarily focus on a specific target group - „ex-combatants‟ and 
associated dependents and camp-followers - with a specific disarmament programme 
element to „reduce or control the number of weapons held by combatants before 
demobilization in order to build confidence in the peace process, increase security and 
prevent a return to conflict.
35
  
 SALW control programmes primarily focus on control and reduction of arms (and 
associated ammunition), with possible programme elements that may address a wide 
variety of types of target population groups or institutions. 
 
Some might argue that DDR is more focussed on promoting state stability and security, 
while SALW control is more focussed on promoting human security by preventing or 
reducing risk and fears of armed violence or coercion. The historical evolution of these 
two types of programme gives some credence to this distinction. Classically, international 
support for demobilisation focussed on supporting the implementation of a peace-
settlement by managing rapid and orderly standing-down of large standing armies after a 
war; and contemporary DDR retains this key focus. In contrast, international support 
                                           
33
 IDDRS Module 2.10, p. 4. 
34
 Based on IDDRS Module 4.11, pp. 6-7; RMDS/G 01.10, p. 4. 
35
 IDDRS Module 4.10, p. 4. 
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SALW programmes focussed on supporting efforts to reduce or control arms and armed 
criminal or societal violence in societies where these were severely affecting substantial 
sections of the civilian population; and were rarely launched in post-conflict societies 
until well after overall state stability had been achieved.  
 
However, recent developments have tended to undermine such distinctions. Most recent 
DDR programmes have in practice addressed human as well as state security; and direct 
beneficiaries have extended far beyond the most dangerous ex-combatant groups that 
pose direct threats to overall state stability. Similarly, as SALW control measures become 
more widely used in countries emerging from conflict, they have often been directly 
relevant to overall state security and stability as well as to security of vulnerable 
individuals and communities.  
 
Moreover, as the IDDRS notes, many of the operational objectives for aspects of SALW 
control programmes „will be identical, similar or complementary to the operational 
objectives of the disarmament component of the DDR programme.‟36 To demonstrate 
this, our Table 3.1 aims to group the IDDRS (and RMDS) objectives in a way that 
facilitates comparison.  
 
Table 3.1: Operational objectives of SALW control and disarmament within DDR 
37
 
Disarmament within DDR SALW Control 
An improvement in the perception of human 
security within communities 
Reduction in the number of weapons available to 
criminals 
Reduction in the number of weapons possessed by, 
or available to, armed forces and groups  
Reduction in actual, or the threat of, armed violence 
Zero, or at the very least minimal, casualties during 
the disarmament component 
Reduction in the number of weapon and 
ammunition accidents 
The need to make a public connection between the 
availability of weapons and armed violence in 
society 
Need to make a public connection between the 
availability of weapons and the amount of violence 
in the society, (by both national authorities and the 
civilian population at large) 
Requirement to build community awareness of the 
problem and hence community solidarity 
Requirement to build community awareness of the 
problem and hence community solidarity 
Reduction and disruption of the transfer and illicit 
trade of weapons within the DDR area of operations 
Reduction and disruption of the transfer and illicit 
trade of weapons on the black market 
 Control of legal weapons through national 
legislation and registration 
 Recovery of stolen weapons from the community 
Reduction of the open visibility of weapons in the 
community, and addressing the culture of weapons 
Reduction of the open visibility of weapons in the 
community, and addressing the culture of weapons 
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Development of norms against the illegal use of 
weapons 
Development of norms against the illegal use of 
weapons  
 Use of SALW control as a launch framework for 
future capacity building and sustainable 
development. 
 
It is thus clear that the operational objectives of SALW control and the disarmament 
measures in DDR in principle overlap strongly, with close operational concerns, which 
emphasise not only the likely need for close co-ordination but also possible programme 
integration.  
 
In practice, there are also several recent examples of internationally-supported DDR 
programmes that have aimed not only to integrate SALW control and community safety 
programmes within them, but even to prioritise the latter over supposedly „core‟ DDR 
elements. These include phases of UN-supported DDR programmes in Southern Sudan 
and in Haiti.
38
 However, the experience of these integration attempts has not been 
particularly happy (as discussed in section 4), arguably because of a combination of: a 
very challenging context; confused decision-making about overall programme elements 
and their co-ordination; contested interpretations of mandates, objectives, and 
institutional roles; and inadequate local „buy-in‟.  
 
If we adopt our own narrower understanding of the scope of disarmament measures 
within DDR – focussed on disarmament and responsible control of arms held by (ex-) 
combatants and their close associates/dependents – there are still major overlaps as well 
as linkages. Firstly, in some DDR programmes, possession and hand-in of arms or 
ammunition is an important element in the official recognition of a person as an „ex-
combatant‟. Secondly, demobilised ex-combatants and their close associates become a 
key concern and possible target group for civilian SALW control activities. These result 
in potentially large overlaps of target groups, as discussed below. Thirdly, „core‟ 
disarmament measures in DDR programmes need to include record-keeping, secure 
storage and responsible disposal (including destruction) of weapons collected from ex-
combatants. They should also aim to promote safe and secure storage of arms and 
ammunition of any parts of armed groups that are not to be demobilised. The latter is also 
a core aim of SALW control programmes; while the former covers virtually the same 
operational requirements as for a civilian weapons collection programme.  
 
3.3.2 Targets and beneficiaries 
SALW control programmes may address a broad range of target groups and beneficiaries, 
in view of their goal of improving controls on arms across all security sector institutions 
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and the wider civilian sector. There are broadly five generic targets within an affected 
country for SALW control interventions: individuals (and communities); governments 
and state agencies (including the police and military); criminals and organized criminal 
gangs; armed groups with political or „war-lord‟ affiliations; and terrorists.39 In practice, 
specific SALW control programmes may directly address one or several such target 
groups. 
 
DDR programmes are focussed on a narrower set of target groups: „ex-combatants‟ and 
their direct associates. The IDDRS lists five categories of people with which DDR 
programmes should engage:
 40
    
1) Male and female adult combatants;  
2) Children associated with armed forces and groups;  
3) „Camp-followers‟ working in non-combat roles (including women);  
4) Ex-combatants with disabilities and chronic illnesses; and 
5) Dependants.  
 
Within this target group, it is the first category of people that potentially pose the most 
immediate risks to state stability and the resumption of armed violence; while the first 
and second categories pose the greatest risks to human or community security from 
armed violence. However, after re-insertion into civilian life, the potentially large number 
of people covered by all five categories all become target groups for SALW control and 
community security-building activities. Thus, key linkages between SALW and DDR 
programmes arise due to their target groups: 
 Overlapping direct target groups, particularly in relation to weapons collection or 
disarmament measures. Particularly after complex conflicts involving poorly disciplined 
or fragmented armed groups, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, DDR programmes have 
often pragmatically decided to accept virtually any individual presenting arms or 
ammunition and a plausible story as an ex-combatant or camp-follower. For better or 
worse, this means that the boundaries are extremely blurred between ex-combatants and 
the wider group of civilians with access to arms.  
 After re-insertion into civilian life, DDR target groups and beneficiaries become key 
concerns for SALW control programmes. At the least, this implies high overlap of targets 
and beneficiaries during the re-integration phase, with obvious advantages for at least 
pooled monitoring and assessments relating to the evolving interests and activities of ex-
combatants and other armed civilians or „veterans groups‟ throughout the post-conflict 
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transition. For example, monitoring to assess the success of DDR programme might be 
linked with surveys to assess such risk groups for SALW control. 
 Establishing the conditions for each others’ success.  For example, the willingness of 
ex-combatants to give up their weapons in DDR programmes will depend greatly on their 
expectations relating to arms possession and availability in the wider community. 
Similarly, the prospects for wider SALW control may be greatly affected by the extent to 
which DDR programmes are successful in the disarmament, dismantlement of armed 
units, and reintegration of ex-combatant adults or children.    
 Measures to address armed groups that emerge after the conflict: it is sometimes 
important to develop measures to demobilise, disarm and re-integrate armed groups that 
have formed after the end of the large scale conflict. Examples include the new armed 
groups occupying rubber plantations in Liberia (check name). These groups typically do 
not qualify for inclusion in internationally-supported DDR programmes, yet they are 
important to the objectives of both the DDR and SALW control/armed violence reduction 
programmes. 
 
3.3.3 Implementing actors 
In principle, both DDR and SALW programmes involve similar categories of 
implementing agencies, including: national governments; security sector institutions 
(particularly military, police and judiciary); local government; community organisations; 
NGOs; and private sector companies. Where relevant, international implementing 
agencies include: UN or other peace-support missions; multilateral and bilateral aid 
agencies; international NGOs; and private contractors. In general, relatively 
comprehensive SALW control programmes involve a wider range of civilian 
implementing agencies than DDR.  
 
In practice, the extent to which the agencies involved in SALW control and DDR overlap 
varies very greatly, according to the specific countries, context and programme designs. 
Since SALW control programmes have tended to start significantly later than DDR and 
have often been relatively small-scale and not comprehensive, the scope for overlap has 
generally been limited. However, there is emerging good practice that SALW 
programmes should begin earlier in post-conflict processes, and be relatively 
comprehensive in scope. So it is likely in the future to be greater potential for overlap of 
implementing agencies.  
 
At an international level, DDR and SALW control programmes appear mostly to be 
implemented by entirely distinct management teams and institutions; even if they are 
nominally embedded within the same UN peace-mission or agencies. More often than 
not, the (weakly institutionalised) recipient post-conflict government has established 
distinct DDR or SALW control commissions or units to engage with the separate 
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international programme structures. Exceptions include those UN DDR missions that 
have extended themselves to include wider SALW control and community security (e.g. 
South Sudan; Haiti), and cases such as Angola where a „victorious‟ government has taken 
control of the national DDR and SALW control processes according to its own priorities 
and concerns.    
 
At the level of implementing specific programme elements, military units (national and 
international) have tended to take the lead on implementing disarmament and 
demobilisation programmes; while institutions responsible for policing and regulation 
tend to take the lead on SALW control elements relating to weapons collection. 
Responsibility for implementation of the re-integration phase of DDR (where it has 
substantially taken place) has generally tended to be led by a distinct set of actors from 
other DDR elements; whether as an ad-hoc cluster of community-based programmes or 
under a major multilateral programme such as the MDRP in Africa.  
 
A host of international and donor agencies and NGOs have contributed to demobilisation, 
re-insertion and re-integration processes, working with specific groups of beneficiaries 
according to their functional expertise and interests, ranging from UNDP, IoM, WfP to 
Save the Children Fund. Local partners in these areas typically include a wide range of 
relevant ministry departments, local authorities, NGOs and local contractors. In practice, 
many of these aim to integrate their contributions to DDR into their wider or existing 
local programmes and activities. At this level, there has in some countries been 
substantial overlap with agencies contributing to the implementation of SALW control 
programmes, particularly where they have had substantial „Weapons for Development‟ 
programme components. But overlap between implementing actors has mostly been 
fragmented and ad-hoc.  
 
At the level of the „beneficiary communities‟, therefore, there have often been a host of 
different implementing agencies contributing to different but closely related aspects of 
DDR, SALW control and other PCR programmes. Although redundancy can have some 
advantages, the risks of confusion, inefficiency and frustration must be real. This in itself 
implies that greater co-ordination or integration should be considered particularly where 
SALW control and DDR programmes are engaging with the same communities and 
regions.  
 
3.3.4 Resources/funding 
In principle, resources to support DDR and SALW control should in the first instance be 
sought from the post-conflict country itself. Post-conflict countries that control 
substantial oil or other natural resources may not be highly dependent on international 
funding. For example, after defeating UNITA, the Government of Angola was initially 
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cautious about agreeing terms to receive international or World Bank aid for DDR or 
SALW control, and for a period relied substantially on its own resources. In most post-
conflict countries, however, DDR and SALW control programmes in practice rely 
heavily on international resources. 
 
At the UN and wider international level, one of the prizes of establishing the concept of 
„DDR‟ as an integrated programme package was to facilitate the mobilisation of 
substantial funding and resources. UNSC-mandated support for DDR programmes can be 
drawn directly from UN Assessed Contributions where they relate to disarmament and 
demobilisation (including re-insertion). International resources to support re-integration 
programmes have to pieced-together from a combination of UN voluntary contributions 
(including through specifically-established Multi-Donor Trust Funds) and bilateral or 
multilateral aid budgets from a variety of donors. This disjunction of funding sources is 
one of the main reasons why reintegration programmes have in practice often been 
relatively uncoordinated with disarmament and demobilisation programme elements. A 
major mechanism established to overcome such problems in the Greater Lakes region of 
Africa is the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) 
managed by the World Bank, which is funded by a mixture of World Bank funds and a 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund.   
 
In contrast, SALW control programmes cannot use assessed contributions (unless under 
the over of being a „DDR‟ programme), and typically rely on support from bilateral 
donors and the EU (through its Joint Action on SALW). In recent years, the UNDP has 
developed a relatively substantial programme to support SALW and related human 
security building programmes, relying mostly on additional voluntary contributions from 
a few OECD donor countries. UNDP‟s SEESAC programme to support SALW control in 
the Balkans is amongst the largest and best established of such programmes.  
 
The overall scale of resources available to DDR programmes, and even to their 
disarmament component taken alone, dwarfs what is allocated to SALW control 
programmes across the world. According to March 2007 figures for the MDRP, nearly 
$300m has been spent over five years,
41
 out of a total budget of $450-500 million.
42
 
These figures do not even include the costs of disarmament, which were expected to be 
funded either from UN peacekeeping operations (where such operations exist) or by 
national governments.
43
 By contrast, the UNDP-managed SALW control programme in 
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the same region has a budget of only $3 million and the budget for the implementation of 
the Nairobi Declaration on SALW is no more than about $2 million. Such comparisons 
are obviously problematic, since they look only at gross figures and do not attempt to 
balance out their relative importance, scale, resource needs, number of beneficiaries, and 
other aspects. There is no particular reason to expect parity, or any particular ratio of 
DDR funding to SALW control funding. Nonetheless, it is clear that DDR programmes 
tend to attract large amounts of resources in a way that SALW control does not. 
 
Certain observations arise from the characteristics of funding sources. Firstly, they 
contribute substantially to one of the main challenges for DDR programmes: the typical 
disjunction between relatively well-resources and rapidly implemented disarmament and 
demobilisation programme elements and delayed and often unsatisfactory support for 
longer term re-integration. Secondly, the often delayed, fragmented, limited and short-
term funding for SALW control programmes means that SALW control initiatives are 
often framed as „pilot‟ projects or seen as auxiliary activities, and resources are rarely 
allocated that would allow truly national SALW control programming. This not only 
limits the extent to which they achieve their potential contribution to human security, but 
may also impact on the degree of co-ordination achieved with much larger and better 
funded DDR programmes.  
 
Thus, enhanced co-ordination or integration of DDR and SALW control measures 
relating to disarmament will depend significantly on initiatives to ensure that sufficient 
resources for the SALW control elements will be available in time to link with the design 
and implementation of disarmament within DDR. One way of achieving this is to 
integrate from the beginning selected elements of SALW control into the mandated and 
relatively well-funded DDR programme, so that assessed contributions or other readily 
mobilised resources can be used. Other possible approaches include enabling SALW 
control programmes to use demobilisation and re-insertion information and activities to 
facilitate effective tracking of ex-combatants in follow-on programmes during the re-
integration phase. We return to these issues in section 5.  
 
3.3.5 Developing Local Ownership 
DDR and SALW control programmes both depend heavily for their success on the 
quality and extent to which national and local „ownership‟ is achieved and developed. In 
both cases, this raises complex issues; relating to „ownership by whom, and for what 
purpose‟. Both DDR and SALW control good practice guidelines emphasise that national 
ownership does not equate merely to the government and representatives of the parties to 
the conflict. The role of civil society is vital, and „encourages the active participation of 
affected communities and groups, particularly those formerly marginalized in DDR and 
post-conflict reconstruction processes, such as representatives of women‟s groups, 
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children‟s advocates, people from minority communities, and people living with 
disabilities and chronic illness.‟44 Similarly, in terms of SALW control, „care should be 
taken to include all stakeholders, even those who are not traditionally seen as weapons 
owners, such as women, children, and the elderly or disabled.‟45 
 
Almost by definition in a post-conflict context, both DDR and SALW programmes have 
to take serious account of the concerns and interests of the powerful parties to the peace 
settlement as well as to wider national and civil society groups. These are bound to be in 
tension, requiring complex judgements about how to maintain and develop appropriate 
local ownership of the DDR or SALW programme over time, and which groups to 
empower or disempower in the process of programme design and implementation in the 
wider interests of long-term peace-building. 
 
The differing contexts and priorities of DDR and SALW programme designers and 
managers tend to lead to different approaches towards „local ownership‟. DDR 
programmes tend to be directly constrained by (and sensitive to) the terms and 
accommodations of the main parties to the peace-agreements, and the main recognised 
armed groups - particularly in the disarmament and demobilisation phases. Powerful mid- 
and high-level leaders tend also to be sensitive to the terms of any re-integration package 
– often they have „sold‟ the peace settlement to their supporters by referring to generous 
re-insertion support; and less honourably they often seek illegitimately to capture for 
themselves some of the resources given to ex-combatants and their dependents. In this 
context, pressurised DDR programme managers risk neglecting developing „ownership‟ 
of the DDR programme by relatively vulnerable ex-combatants and the civilian 
communities to which they are expected to return.   
 
In contrast, the wider range of possible elements and timings of SALW control 
programmes implies broader potential priorities for developing local ownership, 
including the affected communities, their political representatives, and policing and 
justice institutions coming relatively high on the list. Awareness raising programmes and 
sustainability concerns typically has a relatively important place in SALW control 
programmes. In this context, it seems likely that DDR and SALW control programmes 
may often have complementary and mutually re-enforcing priorities and opportunities for 
developing local ownership, implying potentially significant advantages for co-ordination 
or partial integration. 
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3.3.6 Timing and Sequencing 
Timing and sequencing issues are widely acknowledged to be critically important for 
programmes in the insecure and conflict prone contexts of countries emerging from 
conflict. They are therefore important „internal‟ considerations in the design and 
implementation of any DDR or SALW control programme, and are extensively addressed 
in best-practice guidelines in each programme area. In this context, it is likely that timing 
and sequencing between these programme spheres could be important issues for co-
ordination, particularly since they are likely to overlap (at least during the re-integration 
phase).   
 
The IDDRS asserts a generic overall sequencing rule between DDR and SALW control: 
„while the disarmament component of a DDR programme should initially focus on 
former combatants, future measures to deal with the control of legal and illegal civilian 
possession, national stockpiles and security force possession should also be examined at 
the appropriate time. These measures should not be put in place before the demobilization 
phase.‟46  
 
In practice demobilisation is often substantially delayed, and thus such IDDRS guidance 
is open to question. There may well be contexts in which it could be better to initiate at 
least some SALW control activities even before the demobilisation phase of a DDR 
programme is substantially underway. In fact, the IDDRS can be read as inconsistent on 
questions of DDR and SALW sequencing. For example, in one part of Module 4.11 on 
SALW, Security and Development it is stated that „during DDR operations, an SALW 
control component should be established to focus on wider arms control and reduction 
measures at the national and community levels‟47, yet the same module also states that „a 
„follow-on‟ SALW control programme should be planned, and perhaps initiated, during 
the DDR programme to enable a seamless transfer from a peacekeeping to a development 
situation‟48, while Module 4.10 on Disarmament argues that „building the capacity of 
state and non-state national bodies is essential to their empowerment and the effective, 
successful continuation of future disarmament programmes once DDR has come to an 
end‟49 (emphasis added). 
 
In our view, this is symptomatic of the fact that decisions relating to sequencing of DDR 
and SALW control measures are an important area for co-ordination or integration 
between programmes, on the basis of analyses of the particular country and peace-
building context. The interrelationship between arms management or disarmament of ex-
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combatants and of other sectors of the population is sometimes highly sensitive as 
conflicts come to and end, due to political symbolism or more basic insecurities. For 
example, complex interplay may be required, whereby initial disarmament of ex-
combatants needs to be followed by wider progress on SALW collection and control 
before armed groups are ready to fully disarm or demobilise. Similarly wider SALW 
control measures may be needed to reassure ex-combatants when they return (hopefully 
unarmed) to civilian communities, or to clarify norms and future regulations on gun 
possession and use.  It is not clear that the IDDRS has adopted the best overall approach 
here. 
 
3.3.7 Monitoring, Review and Evaluation 
Both DDR and SALW control programmes have been criticised for the general weakness 
of the monitoring, review and evaluation procedures in practice. Monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) has been one of the weakest areas of [DDR) programme management 
in the past, partly due to a lack of proper planning, a standardized M&E framework, and 
human and financial resources specifically dedicated to M&E.
50
 Where systematic 
evaluations are carried out in UN operations, critical reports are often buried. SALW 
control is a younger, less resource-intense field, and it has learnt quickly from the 
development of M&E in related fields such as mine action to develop and test „baseline‟ 
assessments and M&E methods. Nevertheless, monitoring, review and evaluation of 
recent SALW programmes, in post-conflict or other contexts, has been no more than 
patchy. 
For well-understood reasons, it is difficult to evaluate either DDR and SALW control 
programmes in terms of progress towards their overall declared objectives: even if overall 
progress towards security, peace-building or socio-economic re-integration of ex-
combatants can be adequately measured over time, the DDR or SALW programmes are 
only one/two explanatory of factors amongst many others. Thus, process and „output‟ 
indicators are often disproportionately used, where any substantial M&E takes place at 
all.  
 
This could be an area where some pooling of resources could enhance M&E for both 
DDR and SALW control programmes. They could share baseline, context and outcome 
analyses, and also co-operate in developing relevant indicators and methods for each of 
their programmes. In this context, DDR programmes could benefit substantially from the 
emerging experience in the SALW control community, which appears to be further 
advanced in clarifying its objectives in terms of human security and community safety, 
enabling progress in developing appropriate indicators. This has been achieved for 
example through a number of SALW Survey protocols, a key part of which are public 
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perceptions surveys that indicate not only general social attitudes towards weapons, but 
also look in detail at wider perceptions of security. Surveys have been conducted in a 
number of countries, particularly in Africa and South Eastern and Eastern Europe, and in 
a number of instances these surveys have directly informed the development of SALW 
control interventions.
51
 
 
3.3.8 Linkages to other processes 
Both DDR and SALW control fit within a wider network of post-conflict recovery and 
peace-building interventions, and they also both intersect with longer-term development 
processes. One set of linkages, however, is clearly much stronger than the others – the 
relationship of both DDR and SALW control to SSR. The linkages between DDR and 
SSR are explored in depth in Working Paper II of this project.  
 
The links between SALW control and SSR have been less researched, though they are 
briefly analysed in an online „Compendium of Good Practices on Security Sector 
Reform‟ run by the Global Facilitation Network on SSR,52 which have also been adapted 
for IDDRS Module 04.10 on SALW, Security and Development.
53
 Here it may suffice to 
note two obvious linkages. Firstly, SSR often results in the reduction or restructuring of 
security forces, which will require related SALW control measures to ensure that strict 
control and accountability is maintained over the weapons possessed by these forces 
(often this requires weapons destruction). Secondly, successful SSR – in particular, 
successful police reform – should result in improved public perceptions of security, 
which should decrease demand within society for weapons. This provides fertile ground 
for weapons collections/amnesties – but suitable control mechanisms and resources must 
be in place to collect and dispose of such weapons. 
 
In the long term, rather than analysing the links between DDR and SALW control, DDR 
and SSR, and SSR and SALW control in isolation, it may make more sense to consider 
these three processes as three points of a „human security triangle‟, and to explore how 
far they can – and how far they should – be integrated/coordinated. Furthermore, the 
developing field of „community security‟ programming suggests that a fourth overlapping 
element may soon have to be added into the mix. We return to this issue in the conclusion 
of this Working Paper 
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3.4  Mapping Key Areas for Programme Linkages 
Building on the discussion of overlapping issues and concerns between DDR and SALW 
programmes, the following sub-sections aim to map the main areas in which linkages 
between DDR and SALW programmes could be most important to develop and exploit. 
At this stage, this remains an initial mapping of possible priorities for increased co-
ordination or integration. In principle, such a mapping has several dimensions and many 
elements. For simplicity, we first (in section 3.4.1) organise the discussion according to 
phases of DDR and SALW programmes; and then discuss linkages between specific 
sectoral areas of each type of programme. 
36 
 
Table 3.2: DDR and SALW Control: some commonalities and differences 
 
 
DDR Disarmament within DDR SALW Control  
Aims and 
objectives 
To contribute to security and stability in 
post-conflict situations so that recovery and 
development can begin 
To reduce or control weapons held by 
combatants before demobilization to build 
confidence in the peace process, increase 
security and prevent a return to conflict 
To secure a safer environment and control 
SALW within society in order to promote 
conditions that will encourage the continued 
return to normalisation. 
Targets and 
beneficiaries 
Ex-combatants and associated groups 
(children; those in non-combat roles 
(including women); ex-combatants with 
disabilities and chronic illnesses; and 
dependants. 
Ex-combatants who possess an eligible 
weapon 
Individuals (including civilians, criminals 
and terrorists); weapons-affected 
communities; social groups/sectors; 
companies, governments; state agencies 
(military, police etc); neighbouring 
countries. 
Implementing 
actors 
Military and civilian actors from UN 
agencies, national governments, local 
NGOs. 
Trained military staff, usually primarily 
international 
Military and civilian actors from UN 
agencies and national governments; police, 
judiciary, traditional authorities, media, 
local and international NGOs and civil 
society groups. 
Resources/ 
funding 
Major funding, usually combination of 
assessed and voluntary contributions and 
bilateral support 
Usually well funded, assessed peacekeeping 
budget 
Comparatively low funding, multilateral or 
bilateral donor support 
Extent of local 
ownership 
Gradual transfer of ownership to national 
actors through capacity building 
Theoretically „owned‟ by local actors but 
usually depends on international control 
Highly variable, but potential for  high 
levels of national/community ownership 
 
Sequencing/ 
context 
Usually takes place immediately „post 
conflict‟, aims to hand over to longer-term 
development 
First stage of DDR, immediately post-
conflict, though may achieve only partial 
disarmament 
Variable. Usually launched after 
disarmament and demobilisation, likely to 
continue after DDR ends 
Indicators of 
success and 
failure 
Range of indicators for component activities 
but poor measurement of how key aims 
achieved 
Easy to measure number of weapons and 
ex-combatants disarmed, often unclear how 
relates to total in circulation 
Baseline studies of public security 
perceptions increasingly used to judge 
progress 
Links to other 
processes 
Key part of recovery planning, strong links 
to SSR 
Creates conditions for rest of DDR and 
wider SALW control 
Part of recovery and development planning, 
strong links to SSR  
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3.4.1 DDR and SALW linkages through the design and implementation process 
In principle, both DDR and SALW programmes go through several phases of a 
programme cycle (though in practice there are overlaps in complex programmes): 
 Pre-planning and needs assessments; 
 Assessing and promoting a conducive political environment; 
 Programme planning and design; 
 Developing „local ownership‟ and national capacity; 
 Implementing each phase of the programme; 
 Monitoring, review and evaluation;  
 Transition and/or exit strategy implementation. 
 
In this sub-section, potentially important linkages between SALW and DDR programmes 
are identified and briefly discussed for each phase. Since DDR and SALW programmes 
typically start at different times, and operate over different time-scales, linkages between 
different phases of each programme cycle also naturally arise. As discussed in Section 
3.3 above, on the basis of empirical experience as well as principle, we do not make any a 
priori assumptions about such relative timings.  
 
Pre-Planning and Needs Assessments: It is recognized good practice that all post-
conflict reconstruction or security-building programmes, including DDR and SALW, 
should be based on detailed and up-to-date conflict and security assessments. Although 
international guidelines relate primarily to internationally-supported programmes, the 
same principle applies equally to national programmes: post-conflict governments are 
similarly likely to have limited or partial understandings of the complex conflict and 
security context. Such assessments should be initiated as early in the process as 
possible, and preferably before the official peace settlement/agreement itself. Linked 
with such initial conflict and security analyses, systematic needs assessments also need 
to be carried out at an early stage, to clarify requirements and priorities for 
humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and peace- and security-building.  
 
In the past, conflict and security assessments and needs assessments have either been 
neglected or conducted in a fragmented way; with damaging results. In recent years, the 
UN (and other multilateral or regional organisations concerned with post-conflict 
missions) has developed mechanisms and procedures to promote timely and 
comprehensive assessments. Under the UN „integrated mission‟ approach, for example, 
there should be an integrated mission task forces (IMTF) at UN HQ level, linked with an 
integrated mission planning team (IMPT) at country level. Proposals are currently being 
developed in the UN to promote Team Assessment Missions (TAMs) involving teams of 
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experts able collectively to provide comprehensive assessments which can then be used 
by all specific programme teams.  
It is now widely accepted that DDR experts should be included in such early assessment 
missions. These should examine needs and priorities for the whole „package‟ of DDR, 
including re-integration challenges (which need to be taken into account at an early stage 
of DDR programme design).
54
   
In principle, the same case can be made for early expert assessment of wider arms 
management and control issues, including SALW available to civilians. As discussed in 
section 3.3, the domains of DDR and SALW control often overlap substantially, and 
there are good logical as well as empirical reasons to argue that initial security and needs 
assessments should examine both dimensions in an integrated way.
55
 On the basis of such 
integrated assessments, decisions about phasing and appropriate co-ordination of DDR 
and SALW control can be taken on a case-by-case basis.  
Assessing and promoting a conducive political and security environment: DDR 
programmes require certain basic conditions before there are reasonable chances of 
success. For DDR programmes, these include: commitment by all (or almost all) armed 
factions to a peace settlement/agreement; functioning command and control within the 
armed factions; cessation of armed violence between armed parties (at least in the regions 
where DDR is proposed); and adequate engagement by key external stakeholders. It is 
important to ensure that there are realistic prospects for achieving these conditions before 
commitments are made to launch a DDR programme.  
 
The basic conditions for SALW control measures appear to overlap significantly with 
those of DDR, but will also have distinctive elements depending on the type of SALW 
measure. Substantial civilian disarmament can be expected to have more stringent 
contextual requirements than DDR; but other possible SALW measures such as surveys, 
awareness-raising or restricting arms supplies might viably start in conditions that remain 
hostile to DDR. Therefore, there could be potential advantages for close co-ordination or 
integration of measures to assess and promote a conducive environment for DDR and 
SALW.  
 
Programme Planning and Design: The key elements of standard international 
procedures and contents for DDR programme planning and design, in the context of 
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 See, for example, proceedings of International Workshop on Re-integrating ex-combatants, Wassenaar, 
May 2007.  
55
 IDDRS Module 4.30 (pp. 7-8) outlines the contents of a conflict and security analysis for DDR. Most of 
this is also directly relevant for SALW control programmes, and thus the development of joint analyses 
would not be particularly challenging. 
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overall integrated mission planning,  include initial technical assessments, 
development and a strategy and policy framework, and development of a programme 
and operational framework.  
 
The process of planning and designing a DDR programme almost inevitably implies 
consideration of SALW and wider arms management issues, since the two areas of 
concern overlap. At the least, DDR design needs to define the boundaries between its „ex-
combatant and dependents‟ target group and the „civilians‟ that lie beyond its scope. In 
many post-conflict contexts, this boundary is very unclear and the outcome depends 
substantially on the judgement of the programme designers as well as contingent mandate 
and funding constraints. Such judgements should take into account overall assessments of 
risks to human and state security from armed groups, and opportunities for disarmament 
through DDR or SALW control. Moreover, plans for demobilisation, re-insertion and re-
integration need to take into account prospects for wider SALW control or the security 
risks for ex-combatants and recipient communities arising from wide availability or 
misuse of SALW.  
 
These requirements for co-ordination between DDR and SALW programme planning and 
design are recognised in the IDDRS, as discussed in section 2 above. [Moreover, SIDDR 
considered the question of financing DDR programmes in some detail, advocating inter 
alia that „donors agreeing to commit resources to DDR…should not ignore the need for 
planning and financing of broader security transformation‟,56 which includes SALW 
control.] The key point here is that the extent to which disarmament aspects of wider 
SALW control may be integrated into the DDR package is a matter for judgement 
according to the circumstances. The agenda for DDR and SALW programme planning is 
thus of partial integration rather than only co-ordination. In principle, it appears that 
wider arms management measures such as public awareness or stockpile security could 
also be partially integrated in DDR at the planning stage. 
 
IDDRS envisages that planning for distinctive SALW control measures would normally 
start sometime after DDR programmes have been designed and launched. In such cases, 
the new SALW measures clearly should be designed to complement, re-enforce or 
follow-on from the DDR programmes. They should be based on an up-to-date security 
and needs assessment, which could also usefully review the impacts of the DDR 
programme to date. Alternatively (and contrary to UN IDDRS expectations), DDR 
programmes may be substantially delayed – this has certainly been the case in a variety 
of countries, ranging from Cambodia to Burundi. In this context, SALW measures may 
already have been launched, in which case the design of DDR needs to complement, re-
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enforce or follow-on from SALW control. Either way, a powerful case emerges for 
SALW experts and surveys to be included in DDR planning, and vice versa.  
 
Developing local ownership and capacity: The overlaps and differences in developing 
local ownership for DDR and SALW programmes were discussed in section 3.3 above. 
Where elements of SALW control are integrated into DDR programmes, so too will be 
„local ownership‟ issues. Local capacities need to develop to support planning and 
implementation of each security-building programme.  
 
Contexts vary greatly between countries. Where UN or other external agencies play a 
leading role in post-conflict security building (such as in Sierra Leone), proper local 
ownership is often slow to develop, and local institutions to support programme 
implementation (such as national commissions for DDR or SALW control) reflect 
international institutional divisions of labour. After victory or peace agreements 
dominated by local interests (such as in Angola or Nepal), DDR or SALW control 
programmes can be heavily instrumentalised by local interests, who merely pay lip-
service to international guidelines. There are many potential variants between such 
extremes. 
 
Although distinct DDR or SALW programmes require distinctive local management 
capacities, almost by definition, it is generally undesirable to stimulate the establishment 
of fragmented local security-building institutions simply to reflect international 
preferences. Post-conflict countries already suffer from weak or damaged institutions, 
and it is a priority to build local capacity for comprehensive strategies to build human and 
state security.  
 
Thus local capacity building for DDR and SALW programmes should as far as possible 
be co-ordinated, even where they remain distinct in terms of external support. 
Opportunities for promoting local awareness and engagement with SALW control can 
usefully be taken during DDR implementation, and vice versa. Joint training programmes 
could be useful in areas of functional overlap (such as arms registering, storage, disposal 
and destruction). Where the programmes are sequenced, attention should be devoted to 
enable local trained staff and units to transfer from one programme to another wherever 
useful.  
 
SALW- DDR Links in Programme Implementation: It is clear from the foregoing 
sections that are important areas where DDR and SALW processes and programmes 
may link and co-ordinate, due to the overlaps between aims, target groups and 
functional areas. The challenge is to map and prioritise these in a generic way, given 
the many different contexts, programme designs and processes. The functional 
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linkages are mapped and discussed in section 3.4.2 below. Here we focus on some 
other strategic issues relating to programme structure and dynamics. 
 
The „classic case‟ envisaged in IDDRS has DDR programmes launched first, with SALW 
control measures following (if at all) some 12 – 18 months later. In this widely-
recognised context, there is an immediate responsibility for international policy-makers 
to act on these linkages. In this context, critical potential connections include: 
 Designing SALW programmes to address all arms management and disarmament 
issues that remain after disarmament under the DDR draws to a close; 
 Ensuring that the SALW programmes can take full advantage of the knowledge and 
capacities of the relevant D&D programmes as they wind down; 
 Possible formal or informal linkages between re-insertion processes and elements of 
SALW measures, including planning community benefits and providing a supportive 
environment for re-integration; 
 Promoting synergy and undisrupted development of national capacities to develop 
post-conflict human security in a relatively co-ordinated way, undisrupted by transitions 
between internationally-supported programmes. 
 
However, it is important to recognise that there are several other credible sequencing 
arrangements between DDR and SALW programmes, including initiating SALW control 
measures before or at the same as DDR programmes start. In practice, there are several 
different types of SALW control measures, and DDR is not as integrated as proclaimed – 
multiplying the potentially important links. Some of these are noted in section 4.4.2 
below. But the overall implication is that close co-ordination of programme planning and 
design of DDR and SALW is critically important at least to clarify in a timely way the 
priorities for co-ordination for the particular context – and periodically updated as each 
programme evolves.  
 
Where DDR programmes are delayed, for good or undesirable reasons, it becomes very 
important to take realistic account of the de-facto demobilisation and weapons processes 
that have actually taken place. In practice, delayed DDR programme have often fallen 
short in this context: although practitioners have been aware that such processes have 
taken place, for political and institutional reasons DDR programmes have not always 
been designed in a way that thoroughly takes this into account. This is important, because 
delayed DDR is more vulnerable to both perverse results (such as holding weapons in 
order to qualify for Reinsertion packages) and instrumental misuse by local armed group 
leaders. In general, the rationale for profoundly re-configuring DDR and SALW control 
programmes outside the framework envisaged in IDDRS is much stronger where DDR 
(and SALW) programmes are substantially delayed.  
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For example, in the Republic of Congo the MDRP programme to support demobilisation 
and re-integration started over four years after the conflict ended. The resulting D&R 
programme took partial account of this, but with strange eligibility requirements and 
design features (such as children‟s‟ programmes for people who had already reached 
adulthood). UNDP funded a distinct (but linked) SALW collection programme, which 
focussed primarily on arms collection – in practice from civilians as well as from ex-
combatants. Similarly, in the Central African Republic the MDRP supported 
demobilisation and re-integration programmes starting several years after a coup brought 
to an end a period of high instability; with a separate UNDP weapons collection 
programme that linked (in problematic ways) with eligibility for re-insertion benefits.  
 
These two cases illustrate at two main points. First, in several recent cases, the 
organisation of DDR and SALW elements into integrated packages has been done in 
ways that are justifiable but far from what is envisaged in IDDRS. Second, when this is 
done, the capacity to design an appropriately integrated SALW programme, with a 
longer-term perspective, seems to have been lacking: implying the need to prepare for 
such eventualities needs substantial further elaboration.   
 
Monitoring, review and evaluation: As noted, there appears to be great scope to pool 
resources between DDR and SALW programmes for monitoring, review and evaluation, 
- at least for aspects relating to implementation, impact and future priorities. This is 
further explored in section 3.4.2. Here, we focus on strategic points for integrated review 
of needs and programmes not only at initial stages, but at other key milestones.  
 
One of these often strategic review points appears to be 12 – 18 months after the peace-
settlement. In the „classic case‟, the disarmament and demobilisation phases of the 
programme will be underway, and perhaps drawing to a close; alongside the development 
of possible longer-term SALW control, SSR, reintegration and community development 
and reconciliation programmes. In other contexts, lesson-learning from post-conflict 
reconstruction and stabilisation may provide a basis for possible integrated human 
security programmes, including SALW control and elements of DDR. In any case, it may 
be timely for an overall „mid-term‟ review of security needs and priorities to provide a 
basis for comprehensive or integrated longer-term programmes to promote human 
security and reintegration of ex-combatants and other displaced people (IDPs, refugees).   
 
Transition to longer-term peace-building and development, and exit strategies: As 
discussed, programmes designed to disarm and demobilise (including re-insertion) ex-
combatants are conceived to be relatively short-term, while re-integration processes 
and wider SALW control should be designed and implemented with a long-term 
perspective.  The links between DDR and longer-term peace and development processes 
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are considered in Thematic Working Paper No 5 for this Project.
57
 Up to a point, they 
can be broken down to a combination of the longer term consequences of D&D 
measures, on the one hand, and the processes of re-integration (of ex-combatants 
alongside other returnees) into relatively secure and peaceful communities on the 
other.  
 
In principle, the successful co-ordination of DDR with SALW control will in itself 
contribute to a successful long-term transition, provided that such controls develop 
properly over time. In practice, external support for SALW control measures has often 
been relatively short-term and piecemeal, with only fragile local commitment and 
capacity to ensure their sustainability. It thus becomes a priority to ensure that SALW 
controls are not only carefully co-ordinated with the disarmament and demobilisation 
phases of DDR but also are reviewed and put on a long-term footing at the latest by the 
time that re-integration.  
 
This highlights the importance of considering ways to link SALW control measures with 
the re-integration phase. There are potentially several ways in which this could be 
envisaged. Re-integration processes are more likely to be successful in a secure 
environment, to which SALW control measures (and also SSR, reconciliation, and peace-
building) can contribute. Perhaps surprisingly, the IDDRS do not provide elaborate 
guidance on how this might be done. However, within the sphere of SALW control 
measures, there are many potential initiatives that could be targeted for this purpose, 
including a range of public awareness, community-based „weapons for development‟ 
initiatives; stockpile management and disposal. These will often require on-going 
external assistance, at least through the transition, with appropriate sustainability and exit 
strategies for when aid may come to an end.  
 
3.4.1 Integration/coordination of functional elements of DDR and SALW control 
This sub-section follows the discussion above, and explores ways in functional overlaps 
between elements of DDR and SALW control programmes imply important areas for co-
ordination or possible integration during implementation. The eight main types of SALW 
control measures identified in Section 2.2 have been adapted slightly for the purposes of 
Table 3.3 below,
58
 which presents nine operational areas and matches their key activities 
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against related elements of DDR. Brief remarks are also provided on the nature of the 
relationship between these elements, which are then explored further in the main text.  
 
Operational planning and management: The IDDRS advocates the establishment of a 
National Commission on DDR (NCDDR), responsible for policy and strategy 
development, coordination between agencies within the DDR process, coordination of 
DDR with other processes, and final oversight of the implementation of DDR. The 
NCDDR should represent all key stakeholders: a full range of government institutions 
(including those responsible for women, youth and children); the parties to the peace 
accords; international organisations (e.g. the UN, major donors); and civil society and 
the private sector.
59
 Best practice in SALW control also advocates the establishment of 
a national SALW commission, also with the main tasks of policy formation, 
coordination and oversight, and also with the representation of all key stakeholders 
(not just security sector institutions but all related ministries, civil society/private sector 
organisations, and possibly also international organisations).
60
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practice on SALW control. However, there are various international and regional agreements that also 
contain important norms and standards. The establishment of a national SALW commission is also 
recommended by the UN Programme of Action on SALW and by regional agreements such as the Nairobi 
Protocol, the Bamako Declaration, and the SADC Protocol.   
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Table 3.3: Functionally related areas of SALW control and DDR 
 SALW Control DDR  Remarks  
1 Operational planning and management   
 National SALW commission  National commission on DDR (NCDDR) Different in scope, many overlapping elements. 
Must be coordinated to oversee all 
integration/coordination 
 National SALW control programme Overall DDR programme 
2 Information collection and analysis   
 Possible assessment of priority areas for community 
safety projects 
Assessment of areas of return/ resettlement Data on public perceptions of security can be 
shared by both programmes; 
much info collected for DDR planning can be 
fed into SALW programme 
 Study of public perceptions of security 
Comprehensive SALW survey  
Weapons survey 
Risk assessment 
3 Public information and communication   
 SALW awareness campaign/education 
SALW communications strategy 
DDR awareness programme (sensitisation) Information campaigns need coordination to 
avoid mixed messages 
4 SALW collection (and registration)   
 Variety of weapons collection and amnesty 
programmes to reduce illegally-held SALW control, 
using various incentives 
Weapons registration and accounting 
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support 
Lessons from previous weapons collections 
inform both methodologies 
5 SALW destruction   
 Establishment of destruction capability  
Weapons destruction 
Ammunition destruction 
Weapons destruction 
Ammunition destruction 
Simultaneous or consecutive destructions use 
destruction capabilities more efficiently 
6 Stockpile management   
 Weapons storage 
Ammunition storage 
Weapons storage 
Ammunition storage 
Stockpiles may require short-term international 
protection/verification 
7 Cross-border control   
 Cross-border weapons movement prevention 
programme 
Often has regional dimension to deal with 
refugees, „recycled‟ combatants 
DDR has rarely dealt with cross-border weapons 
control 
8 Legislative and regulatory measures   
 Updating of legislation and procedures to improve 
national SALW control regime, incl. framework for 
weapons collection 
DDR process should be approved by national 
law or decree; might also address SALW 
legislation 
DDR should manage transition to stronger arms 
control regime 
9 Addressing instability within communities   
 Safer Community Plans Community-based reintegration Growing area, needs greater research 
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There is obvious potential for close co-ordination of the national commissions for DDR 
and SALW control. Although the IDDRS suggest in one place that the national SALW 
commission „should be a component of the national commission on DDR‟,61 there are 
strong arguments against such deep integration. NCDDRs are established as temporary 
structures designed to implement a specific, finite process (DDR), whereas SALW 
commissions should normally be permanent bodies, since SALW control is an issue even 
for developed peacetime governments. Thus it makes little sense to sub-ordinate SALW 
commissions to NCDDRs (although any specific SALW control measures that are 
integrated into the DDR programme should clearly be managed within the NCDDR 
framework). Operational co-ordination of SALW and DDR programmes in areas where 
there are important links is clearly the priority. In addition, it is important to avoid 
fragmentation of local institutional capacities, with joint planning and assessment 
capabilities and provisions for transfer of appropriate staff and systems to SALW 
commissions or other national institutions as DDR programmes come to an end.  
 
Information collection and analysis: As discussed, this is a functional area offering 
major opportunities for pooled or closely-linked resources across DDR and SALW 
control programmes. This is the case for early pre-planning and needs assessments, 
through assessments for programme design and planning, to mid-programme and 
milestone reviews, and monitoring and evaluation. At key points in each programme 
cycle, both DDR and SALW programming will need detailed surveys and assessments 
relating, for example, to availability and risks of arms and ammunition (including a 
DDR weapons survey amongst armed groups, national small arms baselines and 
follow-on surveys); perceptions of security of specific groups and the public overall; 
community-security needs and priorities (including for communities receiving ex-
combatants or other returnees). For example, UNDP is currently considering the 
possibilities for using SALW baseline assessments ‘to support…programming on a 
wider range of security issues, including DDR’.62   
 
Such information collection is demanding work, requiring substantial skills and capacities 
to use combinations of information collection and assessment methods. People, 
particularly gun-holders and ex-combatants have reason to be cautious and often will not 
readily give information about weapons possession and such-like. Quantitative surveys 
tend to be partial instruments and need to be complemented by qualitative and 
participatory methods to understand perceptions and concerns. Sustained engagement 
with relevant groups and communities can be necessary to achieve detailed reliable 
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understandings. It is important to co-ordinate and share information between programmes 
wherever useful and appropriate.  
 
Monitoring changes of selected factors and perceptions over time provides a key tool for 
measuring the effectiveness of DDR and other peacebuilding interventions. Only 
recently, however, have DDR programmes begun to realise the importance of gathering 
such data. The IDDRS note that „obtaining data on levels of armed violence, impacts on 
security (direct/indirect), levels and types of victimization, and local perceptions of 
security helps to establish a baseline against which to measure changes in the security 
situation and the contribution of DDR to an overall increase in security‟,63 but they are 
still vague on how this data should be obtained, with the section on methodologies for 
data collection mostly giving examples related to weapons proliferation or opportunities 
for economic and social reintegration.
64
 In this respect, SALW control methodologies are 
more advanced, with public perceptions of security forming a key part of most recent 
SALW surveys, primarily through sociological surveys.
65
  
 
Public information and communication: Public information campaigns are a vital 
component of both DDR and SALW control. They have multiple objectives: ensuring 
all stakeholders know what is happening; managing expectations and allaying 
concerns; encouraging the participation and support of target groups and 
communities; persuading spoilers of the benefits of their programmes; demonstrating 
progress to improve perceptions of security; etc. Considerable literature is available on 
public information in both fields: the IDDRS contains a separate module (4.60 on 
Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR); while a 150-
page SALW Awareness Support Pack has been developed by SEESAC, which though 
designed primarily for South Eastern Europe has wider applicability.
66
 
 
Public information is one area in which very strong coordination if not full integration is 
required; to reduce risks of misperceptions or mixed messages to key target groups. This 
does not imply that messages should be integrated. On the contrary, the whole purpose of 
coordinating the supply of public information is to ensure that mixed messages are 
avoided. For example, since the target groups are quite different for classic disarmament 
within DDR and for wider SALW control initiatives (including weapons collections) 
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aimed at the whole community, public information campaigns need to attract the key 
target groups while informing and reassuring others of their role within the process. 
 
SALW collection (and registration): The process of disarming combatants, storing their 
weapons in the short term, transporting them and placing them in safe stockpiles 
and/or destroying them (see below) is a sensitive and technical area that should be run 
by well-trained personnel. This is equally true of weapons collection and registration 
campaigns aimed at civilian-held weapons; indeed, it can be much harder to find 
suitable incentives to encourage participation in civilian weapons collections and 
amnesties. 
 
One of the most obvious ways in which synergies can be built between DDR and SALW 
control programmes lies in the process of learning lessons from previous experience of 
weapons collections: within the country concerned and more widely. Good practice 
guidelines have emerged in both spheres; relating for example to the shift away from 
„buy-back‟ mechanisms – where a cash sum is offered for each weapon – towards a 
concept of „weapons in exchange for incentives‟ (WEI). Buy-back mechanisms both 
within DDR and more broadly have been shown to have a number of disadvantages. For 
example, they may create a secondary weapons market, or encourage corruption. There 
are various ideas as to how to provide non-cash incentives to weapons collections that 
would avoid these problems, which include „weapons in exchange for development‟ 
(WED), „weapons in competition for development‟ (WCD), and „weapons linked to 
development‟ (WLD). These are usually community-based, linking the provision of some 
form of development benefit (e.g. infrastructure projects, training, extra funding) to 
community cooperation in weapons collection. By focusing on communities rather than 
individuals, some of the above risks are reduced, and reconciliation and development 
goals are promoted. It can help to enable an arms collection programme to become a 
focus for community mobilisation and empowerment that can contribute more 
sustainably to human security.  
 
On an operational level, there are potential synergies between disarmament for DDR and 
wider SALW collection programmes in the systems and capabilities for weapons 
collection, registration, safe storage, and either disposal or subsequent tracking of both 
civilian and state-owned weapons. An existing example is through a management 
information system (MIS) created by UNDP‟s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
(BCPR). This is software „to deal with combatant registration and the management of 
weapons and ammunition with a DDR programme‟ called the Disarmament, 
Demobilisation Reintegration and SALW Control MIS (DREAM), which is available free 
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of charge.
67
 It was developed to avoid previous problems faced by DDR programme 
managers who were forced to design a new MIS for each intervention.  
 
There are opportunities to extend the use of DREAM in future. The information collected 
in the system during DDR should then be transferred into the host government‟s national 
registration and tracking systems; DREAM could even be used as a template where new 
computer systems are being established under SALW control programmes. In any case, 
there should be strong coordination between DDR and SALW commissions to ensure that 
the relevant information is transferable/transferred. More generally, national staff trained 
on weapons collection, destruction and stockpile management during the DDR 
programme, and associated systems and equipment, can be retained and used for 
subsequent SALW control programming. 
 
SALW destruction: In both DDR and SALW control programmes, there is a general 
guideline to encourage destruction of at least a substantial proportion, if not all, of 
collected weapons. There are potentially useful opportunities to share arms destruction 
facilities and capabilities, and to learn lessons between programmes about ways to 
design  arms destruction to build confidence amongst relevant stakeholders. Where 
larger quantities of weapons need to be destroyed, it is often a challenge to find the 
necessary resources and capabilities to carry out destruction. The IDDRS recognise 
openly that this is frequently a problem for DDR missions: 
 
Previous DDR programmes have often decided on the final disposal of the 
recovered weapons on an ad hoc basis. The lack of available finance and 
resources during many programmes has hampered this final process of 
destruction. For example, in Mozambique, the weapons were placed initially 
under UN control, but only a limited number of weapons were destroyed and the 
“mission could do no more because it had no budget for destruction and no donor 
could be found to fund the programme”. This is discouraging, because there was a 
wide range of available destruction techniques and technologies, and the required 
human and financial resources were not high as a percentage of the costs of a full 
UN peacekeeping deployment.
68
 
 
Identifying resources for arms and ammunition destruction can also be a problem for 
SALW programmes. There is often limited local capacity to destroy weapons and 
investment may be required to boost local destruction facilities. Pooling resources 
between disarmament and SALW control programmes to address larger numbers of 
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weapons may make destruction processes more efficient overall. Such links could also 
promote the possibility that short-term destruction capacities for DDR purposes 
contribute to longer term national capacities.  
 
Stockpile management and security: Similar opportunities for coordination and 
resource-pooling exist in relation to stockpile management and security. Immediate 
efforts to enhance security and safety of stored and collected arms and ammunition 
associated with DDR or SALW control processes and programmes may usefully be co-
ordinated. Moreover, programme links could help to enable systems established for DDR 
to contribute to the wider focus for SALW control measures on strengthening national 
systems and capacities to manage stockpiles in a sustainable way.  
 
In practice, arms and ammunition stockpile management and security is one of the top 
priority issues for SALW control in post-conflict contexts, and is a major concern for 
DDR. It needs to start as soon as possible, and to be developed sustainably into enduring 
national systems. It therefore needs to be a major driver for close co-ordination or partial 
integration of DDR and SALW control measures throughout the post-conflict transition 
and beyond. 
 
Cross-border control: In many cases, both DDR and SALW control may have regional 
elements that must be taken into consideration. Many modern conflicts cut across state 
boundaries due to political, ethnic or other affiliations or processes, meaning that 
efforts to build peace in one state only can easily be undermined by further fighting in 
neighbouring countries or by cross-border flows of combatants. Large quantities of 
refugees may also cross borders in an attempt to find safety, but these population 
movements are often ‘contaminated’ by armed combatants, which can further 
undermine security.  
 
DDR practitioners have acknowledged that previous DDR programmes have not dealt 
adequately with the complex challenges caused by cross-border population movements, 
and this is now a growing area of policy development.
69
 DDR guidelines now contain 
advice on legal and practical measures for the disarming of foreign combatants and 
refugees. Border management and control is also a major issue for SALW, not least 
since inadequately controlled movements of arms across borders is typically an 
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 The IDDRS has a dedicated module on this topic, Module 5.40 on Cross-Border Population Movements. 
Unfortunately, many of its provisions are weak, doing more to illuminate the problems of cross-border 
movements than to elucidate concrete responses that will solve them. Similarly, a key rationale for 
establishing the MDRP was to better address the complicated cross-border dimensions of the various 
conflicts in the region, but it is debatable how much success it has had in dealing with Combatants on 
Foreign Soil (COFS) and strengthening border controls. 
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important concern. Co-ordination with SALW controls (including revised laws and 
regulations) and SSR (to develop border control systems) can contribute importantly to 
DDR programme effectiveness in this context.  
 
Legislative and regulatory measures: In order to assert their legitimacy and provide a 
legal framework for action, DDR programmes need to be legally approved. This 
usually involves the establishment of an international mandate, agreements between 
the international actors and the national government, and the national adoption of the 
programme through legislation, decree or executive order – including the relevant 
provisions on disarmament and legislation.
70
 However, this is typically a very limited 
affair. 
 
The wider challenge of developing effective legal and regulatory systems remains. This 
relates to provisions to enable weapons collection without fear of prosecutions 
(amnesties etc), as well as adequately comprehensive regulations for arms registration, 
trade, holdings. The IDDRS suggest that this should be part of the DDR programme.
71
 
However, this may be unwise. The establishment or transformation of national SALW 
control procedures and legislation needs to stem from and be an integral part of the 
wider process of strengthening arms controls, and should be synchronised with the 
SALW control programme, a national SALW control strategy and the work of the 
national SALW commission.  
 
Addressing insecurity within communities: As noted above, ‘community security’ is a 
young but rapidly developing field of programming, informed by the shifting emphasis 
towards human security. Part of the logic behind this shift is that since many conflicts 
are not between states but within and across them, (re)establishing national security 
cannot be an adequate solution since it will fail to address the root causes of instability, 
which lie at a lower level; in fact, the re-establishment of ‘national security’ can run 
counter to community security and generate new conflict risks, for instance if this 
‘national security’ is equated with certain privileged groups to the exclusion of others, 
or if it allows the military and other security sector actors to dominate civilian 
representatives. This has spurred a realisation that conflict must be addressed at the 
level of the individual and the solutions rooted in local communities.  
It is revealing that despite different points of departure and different motives, DDR and 
SALW control are both increasingly embracing the community security agenda. In DDR, 
there has traditionally been a major risk that ex-combatants will be perceived as getting 
„preferential‟ treatment from the authorities, regardless of their role in the war, and this 
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can generate tension and lead to the failure of reintegration. However, recently the 
concept of „community-based reintegration‟ has emerged, which aims to ensure that 
equal opportunities are made available to non-combatants and shifts the emphasis from 
the ex-combatants to the community into which they must reintegrate.
72
 Community 
security programmes have even become an integral part of the DDR strategy in some 
places, most notably in Sudan (see Section 4).  
SALW control has come towards community safety from a different direction. It has 
increasingly been understood that SALW control is not an end in itself, so much as a 
means to achieve the wider goal of reducing armed violence and strengthening 
community security. SALW control is thus in a symbiotic relationship with community 
security. Insufficient arms control creates insecurity at the local level, but civilians will 
not surrender weapons unless they feel secure. Community security plans aim to break 
out of this deadlock, engaging the public on safety and security issues in a way that will 
improve public perceptions of security.  
 
Where community security plans are envisaged, there are potential synergies at the 
planning stage: it may be possible to link assessments of areas of return undertaken prior 
to reintegration with the mapping of community security dynamics that precede the 
launch of any community safety plans. Inspiration for community security work or 
community safety planning comes from various quarters that are worth noting: 
1. Within mine action, the concept of „safer village plans‟;  
2. Community development and in particular action-research and PRA techniques;  
3. Urban planning and revitalization (geographically based schemes to improve the 
quality of life at local level for residents);  
4. Community based policing, which focuses on crime prevention and the maintenance of 
public safety by working for sustained collaboration between the police and communities 
to address these problems. 
 
In general, however, it is hard to determine whether community security measures are 
„elements‟ of SALW control and DDR that therefore should be coordinated, or whether 
community security would be better thought of as a distinct area linked with SSR. IN 
practice, it may best be seen as an integrated focus for DDR, SALW control and SSR.
73
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 This is a one of several linked overall conclusions merging from this Working Paper and the companion 
paper (by O Greene and S Rynn) on DDR and SSR. See also Saferworld, „Creating Safer Communities: 
Lessons from South East Europe‟, http://saferworld.client.fatbeehive.com/publications.php?id=236 
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4. Experience of Links between DDR and SALW programmes 
The previous section has provided a detailed analysis of the multiple links possible 
between DDR and SALW programme and the opportunities for enhanced co-ordination 
or partial integration. Section 4 now examines the links that have emerged from 
experience with DDR programmes. It begins with a brief overview of all the major DDR 
programmes in recent years where there have been significant issues regarding SALW 
proliferation (which have usually, but not always, led to a SALW control programme 
being launched). It then looks in more detail at a number of case studies. These draw 
substantially on case studies conducted (and separately available) for this project.  
 
4.1 Overview of recent experiences of integration/coordination 
This section provides a summary of the major DDR programmes that have been 
implemented in recent years showing how their relationship to any SALW control 
activities in the country (whether this was foreseen in the programme or not). It thus 
provides a very broad overview of recent cases, presented in the form of Table 4.1, which 
gives simplified descriptions of the DDR and SALW situation in 22 countries, the DDR 
and SALW control programmes that have taken place, who has implemented them, and 
the extent of integration/coordination that can be discerned. The aim is simply to provide 
a sense of what has happened in practice and to discern broad trends where possible. 
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Table 4.1: Overview of relationship between SALW control and DDR in major DDR programmes 1990-2007 
Country
74
 Date Implementin
g actors 
DDR situation & 
programme 
SALW 
situation & 
programme 
Extent of integration/ coordination 
Afghanistan
75
 
2002-
present 
UNDP 
(funded by 
Japan, UK, 
Canada, 
USA, 
Netherlands, 
Norway, and 
Switzerland) 
DDR only of 
Afghan Military 
Forces (AMF); 
closely linked to 
SSR. DDR of AMF 
completed in 2006. 
New project on 
Disarmament of 
Illegal Armed 
Groups (DIAG) for 
2005-2007 
Initial DDR 
ignored 
wider 
SALW 
situation, 
although 
project on 
ammunition 
stockpiles 
exists. DIAG 
targets 
armed 
groups but 
not civilian 
ownership, 
no wider 
SALW 
programme. 
DIAG‟s 
progress is 
slow. 
DIAG is an extension of the original 
DDR process, run under the same 
wider framework (reuse of 
resources); however, it was a 
response to severe security challenges 
rather than planned in advance 
Angola
76
 2002-
present 
MDRP 
(funded by 
MDTF, 
World Bank, 
Several previous 
failed programmes. 
Angola 
Demobilisation and 
Wide 
proliferation 
and 
insecurity. 
Unclear 
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 Information for this table has been collated from a wide variety of sources; the most important sources are footnoted for each country as appropriate. 
Information on broader SALW control activities largely sourced from Biting the Bullet Consortium, “Reviewing Action on Small Arms”, 2006. 
75
 International Crisis Group, “Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan”, 2003; International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on 
Track”, 2005; Website of Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme: http://www.undpanbp.org/, accessed 12.06.07; UN DDR resource centre Afghanistan 
country page.    
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 MDRP Monthly Statistical Progress Report March 2007; Gomes Porto & Parsons, 2003 
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EU, and 
others)  
Reintegration 
Programme 
(ADRP) has 
demobilised 
c.100,000 of target 
138,000 ex-
combatants. 
No major 
SALW 
programme; 
some NGO 
projects; 
national 
SALW 
commission 
exists but no 
SALW 
control 
strategy.  
Burundi
77
 2004-
present 
MDRP Demobilisation of 
approx. 55,000 
members of armed 
movements and 
Burundi Armed 
Forces; close links 
to SSR 
Signed 
Nairobi 
Protocol, 
some 
activity 
through 
Regional 
Centre on 
SALW 
(RECSA). 
SALW 
coordination 
body exists 
but no 
SALW 
strategy 
Unclear 
Cambodia
78
 1992 and 
1999-2001 
World Bank Demobilisation 
under UN 
Transitional 
Authority 
Major 
project: EU 
Assistance 
on Curbing 
Unclear 
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 MDRP Monthly Statistical Progress Report March 2007; UN DDR resource centre Burundi country page; RECSA website: http://www.recsasec.org/  
78
 EU-ASAC website: http://www.eu-asac.org/; UNTAC Background Information http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr2.html, both 
accessed 12.06.07. 
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suspended in 1992. 
World Bank D&R 
programme 
demobilised 15,000 
but little overall 
impact  
SALW in 
Cambodia 
(EU-ASAC) 
collected 
over 130,000 
weapons; 
reduction in 
armed 
violence. 
Strong civil 
society 
engagement. 
Central 
African 
Republic
79
 
2002-2003 
and 2004-
2007 
MDRP 
BCPR 
Initial D&R project 
(PNDR) not 
targeted specifically 
at combatants, 
poorly executed, 
stopped early. New 
programme 
(PRAC) run 2004-
2007, DDR of 
c.7,500 ex-
combatants. 
UNDP 
SALW 
control 
programme 
2006-2009 
launched as 
part of 
transition 
from PRAC 
(with justice 
and security 
projects). 
SALW programme designed at later 
stage, but clearly builds on DDR 
programme. National DDR 
Commission reshaped as 
Commission on SALW, 
Disarmament and Reinsertion 
(CNPDR) 
Colombia
80
 2003-
present 
National 
government 
DDR programme is 
unusual and largely 
not internationally 
supported, as it 
deals with only 
some paramilitaries 
while conflict 
continues.  
Quite tough 
gun control 
in some 
cities but 
one of 
highest gun 
crime rates 
in world. No 
comprehensi
DDR of paramilitaries seen as way of 
reducing gun crime but not linked to 
wider SALW control and community 
security programmes 
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 Florquin, 2006; Berman, 2006. 
80
 Human Rights Watch, “Smoke and Mirrors”, 2005; Pax Christi, “A New Beginning”, 2006. 
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ve SALW 
programmes 
Cote 
D‟Ivoire81 
2005-
present 
UNDP DDR programme 
agreed in 2005 
peace agreement 
but never 
implemented due to 
political tensions 
Pilot SALW 
reduction 
project 
planned 
within DDR 
programme  
SALW reduction project planned by 
UNDP within DDR programme; 
details unclear; not implemented 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo
82
 
2004-
present 
UNDP/MON
UC/MDRP 
Very complex post-
conflict 
environment, very 
complex DDR 
programme; pilot in 
Ituri had some 
success but poorly 
managed 
SALW 
proliferation 
is very 
severe; line 
between 
combatants 
and civilians 
very blurred, 
high 
insecurity – 
therefore no 
separate 
SALW 
project 
Extreme instability makes it difficult 
to establish longer-term SALW 
measures until majority of illegal 
armed groups disarmed. 
East Timor
83
 2001-2002 IOM and 
others 
(funding by 
USAID, 
World Bank, 
Japan, 
Canada) 
DDR of active 
FALINTIL 
liberation army 
members; large 
number of veterans 
not included 
Unclear Unclear 
Haiti
84
 2004-
present 
MIUNSTAH 
(UN Mission 
Programme 
redesigned because 
One of five 
key 
SALW control fully integrated. 
However, it is debatable how far the 
                                           
81
 UN DDR resource centre Cote D‟Ivoire country page; UNDP Cote D‟Ivoire: http://www.ci.undp.org/, accessed 12.06.07   
82
 UN DDR resource centre DRC country page; Amnesty International, “DRC: DDR and Reform of the Army”, 2007.  
83
 McCarthy, 2002.  
84
 UN DDR resource centre Haiti country page; Muggah, BCPR Strategic Review, 2006; Muggah, “Securing Haiti‟s Transition”, 2006. 
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(redesign 
2006) 
in Haiti, 
organised by 
DPKO)/UND
P 
conditions do not 
suit „classic‟ DDR: 
insecurity caused 
by armed criminal 
groups. New 
programme aims to 
reduce armed 
violence  
priorities of 
UN 
programme 
is the 
reinforceme
nt of 
legislative & 
institutional 
framework 
to control 
SALW 
proliferation 
„DDR‟ mission is truly engaged in 
DDR; also, programme has faced 
multiple setbacks 
Indonesia 
(Aceh)
85
 
2005-2007 National 
government, 
EU, UNDP, 
others 
Demobilisation and 
reintegration of 
GAM veterans as 
part of Aceh peace 
process. 
No 
particular 
arms control 
measures 
beyond 
GAM 
disarmament
. National 
government 
lacks SALW 
strategy. 
Unclear 
Liberia
86
 2003-
present 
UNMIL (UN 
Mission in 
Liberia, 
organised by 
DPKO)/UND
P 
Disarmament and 
demobilisation of 
over 100,000 ex-
combatants by 
2005. Foreign 
fighters repatriated. 
Reintegration 
programmes 
continue. 
UNDP-
backed 
Community 
Arms 
Collection 
and 
Developmen
t (CACAD) 
programme 
launched in 
Community-based SALW 
programme launched after initial 
disarmament; good coordination 
apparent between SALW and DDR 
bodies.  
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 Centre for Security Sector Management, “DDR Programme in Aceh Indonesia 2005-2006”, 2007. 
86
 UN DDR resource centre Liberia country page; Case study of Liberia (carried out for this project);  
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2005 
following 
end of 
formal 
disarmament
. National 
SALW 
commission 
established 
Mozambiqu
e
87
 
1994-1996 UNOMOZ 
(UN Mission 
in 
Mozambique) 
DDR of 100,000 
combatants faced 
many obstacles, 
deemed largely 
unsuccessful. 
Only small 
proportion 
of arms 
collected, 
even less 
destroyed, 
major cross-
border 
problems. 
Various 
projects 
since, 
including 
Operation 
Rachel 
jointly with 
S Africa. 
Little thought appears to have been 
given to wider SALW control issues 
when DDR was designed and 
implemented 
Nepal 2006 UNDP, 
others? 
DDR of Maoist 
rebels and 
downsizing of 
government army 
Unknown Unclear 
Philippines 
(Mindanao)
88
 
1997-
present 
Government 
(World Bank, 
other actors 
No demobilisation, 
little disarmament; 
focused on 
“BARIL” 
programme 
collected 
Unclear 
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Leão, 2004.  
88
 Makinano & Lubang, 2001. 
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support 
development) 
integration of 
MNLF members 
into national 
army/police 
4,750 
weapons, but 
most MNLF 
arms not 
collected. 
No known 
SALW 
control 
projects, no 
national 
commission. 
Republic of 
Congo
89
 
2000-
present 
UNDP Relatively 
successful 
Reintegration and 
Collection of 
SALW programme 
ran 2000-2002, 
closed for lack of 
funding. Used 
innovative 
community micro-
projects. Follow-up 
PCAD launched 
2004, on hold. 
Small arms 
collection 
and 
destruction 
(PCAD) 
largely for 
ex-
combatants 
but wider 
elements 
too. 
Government 
launched 
DDR 
programme, 
not 
coordinated 
with PCAD. 
Violence has 
stalled 
process 
Some attempts at 
integration/coordination but poor 
communication with national 
government 
Sierra 
Leone
90
 
1998-2004 UNAMSIL 
(UN Mission 
Initially DDR 
unsuccessful but 
CACD 
(Community 
DDR did not deal with wider SALW 
but CACD launched as effective 
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 Nichols, “Republic of the Congo” 2006. 
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in Sierra 
Leone) 
mostly achieved in 
2001.  
Arms 
Collection & 
Destruction) 
and CACDII 
projects. 
Community 
focused: 
arms for 
development
. 
follow-up. 
Solomon 
Islands
91
 
2002-2004 UNDP/Regio
nal 
Assistance 
Mission to 
Solomon 
Islands(RAM
SI) 
UNDP funded 
D&R of Special 
Constables (no 
disarmament as 
supposedly not 
armed). Australian-
led RAMSI 
addressed 
disarmament from 
2003 
UNDP-
funded 
„Weapons 
Free 
Villages‟ 
(WFV) in 
2002. 
RAMSI and 
UNDP ran 
21-day 
amnesty in 
2003 that 
collected 
significant 
quantities of 
weapons 
WFV programme innovative but had 
little effect on disarmament; later 
amnesty supported both DDR and 
wider disarmament. 
Somalia
92
 2002-
present 
UNDP Rule of Law and 
Security (ROLS) 
programme has 5 
components: 
Judiciary; Law 
SALW 
control one 
of five 
elements of 
ROLS 
Complex and entrenched conflict: 
distinction of military & civilian roles 
very blurred, high SALW 
proliferation. ROLS more suited than 
„classic‟ DDR 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
90
 Case study of Sierra Leone (carried out for this project); CICS University of Bradford, “Armed Violence and Poverty in Sierra Leone”, 2005; Nichols, “Sierra 
Leone”, 2006. 
91
 Nelson, 2006. 
92
 UNDP Somalia Rule of Law Programme homepage: www.so.undp.org/page.asp?id=655  
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enforcement; DDR; 
SALW control; 
mine action.  
programme. 
First phase 
to 2005 
focused on 
Somaliland, 
now broader 
Sri Lanka
93
 2002-
present 
UNHCR, 
IOM and 
others 
Shaky ceasefire. No 
proper DDR but 
major reintegration 
programmes for 
IDPs and refugees 
from conflict 
Major 
SALW 
proliferation. 
National 
commission 
established 
in 2004.  
Ongoing violence makes DDR 
unlikely. Ongoing SALW projects 
may be fed into later DDR 
programmes. 
Sudan
94
 2004-
present 
UNMIS (UN 
Mission in 
Sudan)/UND
P 
Interim DDR 
Programme 
(IDDRP) addresses 
special needs 
groups first. 
Includes 
community security 
and SALW 
elements. No full 
DDR yet 
Many armed 
groups, 
military 
SALW 
widespread 
among 
civilians. 
Arms 
Reduction 
and Control 
is key 
section of 
IDDRP.  
Far-reaching integration of SALW 
control and community security into 
DDR; some donors are critical, 
suggest they be separated 
Uganda
95
 2003/05-
present 
MDRP and 
UNDP 
(separate 
programmes) 
MDRP: D&R of 
fighters under 
Amnesty Act. 
UNDP Human 
Security 
Active 
SALW 
commission 
(National 
Focal Point) 
Linkages with DDR called for within 
National Action Plan, but limited 
practical co-operation or integration 
to date. 
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 Bartolucci, 2007.  
94
 UN DDR Resource Centre Sudan Country Page; UNDP Sudan website: http://www.sd.undp.org/; International Crisis Group, “Sudan‟s Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement”, 2006. Case study of Sudan carried out for this project 
95
 MDRP Monthly Statistical Progress Report March 2007; UN DDR Resource Centre Uganda Country Page. Case study of Uganda carried out for this project 
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Programme 
includes DDR and 
SALW Control 
with 
comprehensi
ve SALW 
strategy 
(National 
Action 
Plan). 
64 
 
Although this table is very broad in scope and there is a danger of simplification and 
over-generalisation, certain observations can still be made.  
 
Firstly, in many DDR programmes, even some that are currently taking place, it does not 
appear that SALW issues have been considered as a matter of course or that attempts 
have been made to analyse the relationship between DDR and SALW control. 
Nonetheless, there is a clear trend towards exploring this relationship and trying to build 
functional ties between them, as evidenced by many of the more recently launched 
programmes.  
 
Secondly, there are several examples (e.g. Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone) of SALW 
programmes being designed during the later stages of DDR or as a follow-up once DDR 
is officially over. On the one hand, this suggests that some linkages have been formed 
between DDR and SALW control, and that SALW control measures are intended to build 
on the foundations for peace and security created by the DDR process. On the other hand, 
it appears that SALW control was not considered from the start, but was addressed only 
after the DDR programme was quite advanced and a number of difficulties with wider 
SALW proliferation had arisen. Furthermore, it is hard to escape the impression in such 
cases that SALW control activities have been seen as makeshift activities that are put into 
place when DDR is over or stalling, rather than as an integral part of the peacebuilding 
and security strategy. 
 
Thirdly, in several cases (particularly the DRC, Somalia and Sudan) the conflict and 
human security situation is severe and extremely complex, and there is no clear 
distinction between armies, armed groups, and civilians. Peacebuilding interventions thus 
face enormous practical challenges. It is very hard to delineate clear plans for DDR, 
SALW control and other measures, and numerous factors continue to threaten to derail 
these plans. Finally, there are examples (e.g. Haiti, South Sudan) of attempts to approach 
DDR in a broad way, integrating SALW control, armed violence reduction and 
community security building priorities into the DDR programme framework. This 
indicate a realistic appraisal that comprehensive programmes are necessary, but the 
experience has not been satisfactory in several ways, with serious problems of internal 
divisions within UN missions, and problems of co-ordination and implementation within 
the overall programme framework.  
 
The four case studies that are presented below have been chosen to demonstrate a range 
of different SALW and DDR interventions and inter-relationships.  
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4.2 Sierra Leone
96
  
Sierra Leone is often held up by the international community as one of the most 
successful DDR projects undertaken, and is widely believed to have made a very 
significant contribution to the re-establishment of peace following years of brutal 
conflict. Yet the case study paper argues that to some extent the virtues of the DDR 
process in Sierra Leone have been overplayed and that „DDR‟s potential to improve 
human security was not fully realised‟. Community consultations held as part of the case 
study revealed various weaknesses of the DDR programme, mainly relating to 
demobilisation and reintegration, which were criticised for failing to genuinely provide 
alternative livelihoods, failing to handle vulnerable groups with adequate care, and being 
considerably less „community-based‟ than claimed. 
 
From an arms control perspective, however, the situation looks brighter. Disarmament 
got off to a shaky start, as initial attempts at DDR launched in 1998 soon foundered, and 
the renewed efforts made after the signing of the Lomé Accord in 1999 quickly became 
ineffective because of continued fighting despite the official ceasefire. This culminated in 
a crisis in 2000 when about 500 peacekeepers were taken hostage. After this crisis was 
resolved, the international community made more strenuous efforts to enforce peace, and 
by 2001 genuine disarmament was taking place. It is widely acknowledged that this was 
very successful in removing a large amount of weapons: by January 2002, when DDR 
was officially declared „complete‟, 72,500 combatants had been disarmed and 
demobilized, and 42,330 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected 
and destroyed. This in itself was a significant achievement.  
 
Importantly, however, neither the Government of Sierra Leone nor the international 
community rested on its laurels, and it was openly acknowledged that there were still 
many weapons circulating within the country. This was partly because of an awareness 
that despite the large number of demobilised ex-combatants, there was no way of 
knowing exactly how many weapons were in circulation, especially as many weapons 
were thought to have entered into civilian possession, which had not been addressed by 
the DDR process at all. It was also because there were various armed groups who had 
been wary of – or felt disenfranchised by – the main DDR process and had not 
surrendered weapons as part of the official disarmament process. As a first response to 
this, a Community Arms Collection and Destruction (CACD) project was launched by the 
Government of Sierra Leone. It was run by the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), with support 
from the National Commission for DDR (NCDDR) and the UN Mission in Sierra Leone 
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 As well as the case study of Sierra Leone carried out for this project (REF), this section also draws 
significantly on the following two sources: CICS University of Bradford, “Armed Violence and Poverty in 
Sierra Leone”, 2005; Nichols, “Sierra Leone”, 2006. 
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(UNAMSIL). CACD launched a temporary amnesty, coupled with the threat of 
prosecution for those found in possession of a weapon after the amnesty expired. 
 
CACD had some success, collecting nearly 10,000 weapons, but it had not even been 
extended to all parts of the country before the project came to a close. The Government of 
Sierra Leone therefore launched a new arms control project in conjunction with UNDP, 
named CACDII, which was implemented in early 2003. This was seen as a preparatory 
phase for a longer-term engagement in the form of an Arms for Development (AfD) 
programme. CACDII took on board various lessons both from the challenges faced by the 
first CACD and from wider international experience, and was considerably different in 
design. It aimed both to provide a national architecture for SALW control work through 
the development of new arms control laws and strategies, and to pilot a new approach to 
weapons collection that stressed community engagement and the provision of 
development projects in exchange for the establishment of „weapons free‟ communities. 
Work on the strategic side stumbled as it became clear how complicated it would be to 
pass legislation, but the pilots of the arms-for-development approach were largely 
successful. This led to the implementation of the AfD programme, which has gradually 
been spread across the country. There have been several reviews of both CACDII and 
AfD, and it appears that programme managers have allowed the programme to develop 
further in response to the findings of these reviews.
97
 
 
Although CACDII and AfD are widely considered to be successful projects, they have 
had some problems. Perhaps the biggest issue is that the AfD approach has been 
successful in rural areas, but it was not really designed to tackle the very different 
problems surrounding arms reduction/control in more urban areas. This is particularly 
true of the capital, Freetown, where high-levels of crime and armed violence continue to 
cause concern. There have also been grumbles about the amount of money provided for 
development projects (initially this was set at $20,000, but due to exchange rate 
fluctuations it was instead set at 40 million Leones, which often turned out to be much 
less), and about improper substitutes being given to hunters whose hunting weapons have 
been indefinitely confiscated.
98
 Some community respondents interviewed for the case 
study paper also called into question the „local ownership‟ of the CACD process. Despite 
these failings, however, CACDII and AfD are generally believed to have had a positive 
impact, and have demonstrated the benefit of many more progressive measures, such as 
ensuring that arms control is community based, engaging NGOs in the process (including 
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in the National Commission on SALW), and linking SALW control to policing and wider 
peacebuilding. 
 
It may be possible to argue that since SALW control was addressed only after DDR was 
completed, and that both programmes are regarded as successes, it may not  in fact 
necessary to integrate/coordinate them. Certainly, it appears that there was a logical 
sequencing in terms of dealing adequately with „disarmament within DDR‟ and not 
muddying the waters before addressing civilian possession, which in this case worked 
well. However, the decision to launch SALW control after DDR was over was not so 
much part of a long-held plan to do things in this way, so much as a realisation that DDR 
had ignored a problem that urgently needed to be addressed. Although they were not 
integrated as such, the involvement of the NCDDR in the initial CACD project shows 
that significant coordination was taking place and that the inter-linkages between the two 
issues were acknowledged. Furthermore, SALW control programme managers remained 
open to constructive criticism and new ideas and continued to develop and strengthen the 
programme as it developed.  
 
Lastly, it may also be argued that the relative success of the arms control process in Sierra 
Leone is in part thanks to a „positive loop‟ – international actors have invested so much in 
post-conflict reconstruction and are so keen to ensure that it continues to be viewed as a 
success that it is probable that they have been more supportive of SALW control 
measures than is often the case. Perhaps the main lesson from Sierra Leone is that the 
programmes were sufficiently responsive to change to achieve their goals, but that it 
would have still been better to have planned (even if not launched) SALW control 
measures from an earlier stage. 
 
4.3 Liberia
99
 
In many ways, Liberia has faced similar challenges with regards to DDR and SALW 
control as Sierra Leone. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the measures that have been taken in 
response are also broadly similar, right down to the names: a preparatory phase titled 
Community Arms Collection for Development (CACAD) followed by a longer-term 
Arms for Development (AfD) Programme. Rather than give an overview of the entire 
process of arms control in Liberia, therefore, this short section focuses on a couple of 
aspects that are less similar to Sierra Leone. 
 
Liberia first attempted DDR in 1996 following the end of the hostilities known as the 
First Liberian Civil War. However, the country soon slumped back into conflict, and it 
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was only at the end of the Second Liberian Civil War in 2003 that DDR became realistic. 
Yet this DDR was also very nearly derailed at the start following chaotic scenes at one of 
the demobilisation centres, Camp Schieffelin near the capital, Monrovia. The UN 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was dispatched to support DDR, but on it very quickly 
became clear that it had been launched too soon and the Mission was unprepared to 
manage the process effectively. On 7 December 2003, significant numbers of heavily-
armed government fighters turned up at the camp expecting to instantly receive the $300 
cash payment of which they had heard talk. When they discovered that they would 
receive only $150 instantly and would have to wait until the end of a three-week 
demobilisation programme for the other $150, they began to riot. In the end, the crowds 
were calmed and crisis was averted, but this demonstrated how unprepared UNMIL had 
been, and also acted as a further nail in the coffin of weapons buy-back schemes. More 
generally, it appears that both the Government of Liberia and the international 
community had under-estimated the huge demand that the DDR programme would 
create, in terms of the amount of people disarming and the speed at which they reported 
for disarmament. This put huge strain on DDR in the early months of the process.  
 
According to the NCDDRR, from December 2003 until the formal end of the DDR 
process in November 2004, a total of 103,019 (68,162 men, 22,370 women, 8,523 boys 
and 2,440 girls) had been demobilised, handing in 28,314 weapons, 33,604 heavy 
munitions, and 6,486,136 small arms ammunition. This suggests a very low ratio of 
weapons handed in per demobilised person. As a result, it was feared that despite the 
large number of people engaging in the DDR process, large quantities of weaponry 
(including heavy weaponry) may still be at large within the country. This led to the 
development of the AfD Programme, which was launched in 2006 and is expected to run 
for several years. Like Sierra Leone, it focuses on community engagement, promotes the 
concept of „weapons free‟ districts, is linked into community policing initiatives, and also 
attempts to establish a national framework for arms control. The AfD Programme is less 
advanced in Liberia than in Sierra Leone, however, and in the meantime, considerable 
insecurity continues to be reported, particularly in Monrovia. Nonetheless, consultations 
carried out for the case study paper suggested that respondents did not view arms 
proliferation as a priority security concern, with issues such as corruption, bad leadership 
and lawlessness heading the list of causes of insecurity and further conflict.
100
  
 
In general, while the perceived success of interventions in Sierra Leone may imply that it 
is possible or even preferable to ignore integration/coordination of DDR and SALW 
control, in Liberia, which is still at an earlier stage in the AfD process, the jury remains 
out. Arms control interventions have learnt much from similar programmes in Sierra 
                                           
100
 Liberia case study paper [REF], currently p. 26 
  
69 
 
Leone, and have also adopted many progressive elements, but it is unclear whether any 
attempts have been made to link SALW control with the longer-term processes of 
reintegration and related community-level engagement, or whether this will present many 
problems in the future.   
 
4.4 Uganda
101
 
Uganda represents a very different case from Sierra Leone and Liberia in terms of both 
DDR and SALW control. Firstly, recent conflict in Uganda has primarily occurred in the 
north of the country, while other parts of Uganda have remained relatively peaceful and 
experienced development and growth. Secondly, unlike most situations in which DDR is 
implemented, Uganda has quite a wide-ranging SALW control programme and national 
mechanisms for SALW control are in place. Thirdly, the DDR process has been 
significantly more „locally owned‟ than other DDR interventions recounted here since it 
is primarily run by the Government of Uganda and has received only limited international 
support. Fourthly, however, it is debatable whether the disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration activities that have taken place in northern Uganda in recent years qualify as 
„DDR‟ as defined in this paper, since they have been carried out in advance of any peace 
agreement between the Government and the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA) and the 
constituent elements of DDR have not been conceived of or implemented as a single 
programme within which all actors and projects are subsumed. Rather, they have 
occurred within the context of a broad range of initiatives that have been implemented by 
various actors within the country, including the Government of Uganda, NGOs and 
donors agencies, seeking to address past and ongoing conflicts. 
 
Those DDR activities that have taken place in Uganda in recent years have done so 
primarily under the framework of the 2000 Amnesty Act, which established procedures to 
grant legal amnesty to „reporters‟, i.e. members of insurgent groups who „report‟ 
themselves to the authorities and agree to disarm and demobilise. The Amnesty Act 
provides for the establishment of an Amnesty Commission to monitor demobilisation and 
reintegration and for local Demobilisation and Resettlement Teams (DRTs). „Reporters‟ 
can present themselves to various senior figures, such as ‘the nearest Army or Police 
Unit, a Chief, a member of the Executive Committee of a local government Unit, a 
magistrate or a religious leader within the locality’, and are then handed over to a 
DRT.
102
 It is thus fundamentally a locally-owned and driven process, though it has 
received funding from a variety of bilateral and multi-lateral donors, including the MDRP 
under a „Special Project‟.  
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Over the past years, Uganda has taken considerable steps to strengthen arms control. At 
the national level, it has established a functioning National Focal Point (NFP; in many 
countries these are referred to as national commissions) including a broad range of 
government and non-governmental representatives, and has developed a National Action 
Plan (NAP) on SALW. It has also co-operated actively at the regional level on 
implementing the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW 
in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa. It is thus a potentially strong candidate for 
greater integration/coordination of DDR and SALW control, and indeed there has been 
some limited success in this regard. Nonetheless, much of this potential has remained 
unrealised, partly due to a lack of government capacity. At the planning level, there is 
some recognition of the ways in which Uganda‟s NAP could link to the DDR process, 
including the future DDR of remaining LRA which has been the subject of recent peace 
negotiations. The NAP states that linkages should be established with DDR and joint 
activities undertaken, but to date this has resulted in little practical co-operation. The NFP 
Secretariat has however indicated that it hopes to strengthen linkages with the DDR 
process as implementation of the NAP progresses and has identified a number of possible 
areas where such co-operation could occur. For example, the NFP could contribute to the 
disarmament process by helping to establish norms for weapons collection, storage and 
destruction, by providing trainings, and by establishing programmes that supported 
civilian arms control in areas where reintegration was expected to take place. Additional 
capacity within the NFP will however be required in order to take this forward. 
Meanwhile, the mandate of the Amnesty Commission in relation to disarmament is 
somewhat unclear and in practice the army – the Ugandan People‟s Defence Force 
(UPDF) – are playing a leading role in the disarmament of reporters. The UPDF report 
that all weapons collected are registered and then destroyed, but some people have raised 
concerns regarding the lack of transparency surrounding this process and the difficulty in 
ascertaining whether all arms are destroyed.  
 
4.5 Sudan
103
 
The Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) in Sudan is one of the first DDR programmes to 
place the ideas at the heart of its focus. It is a highly „progressive‟ plan that consciously 
places human security at the heart of the whole intervention. Furthermore, it ambitiously 
attempted to integrate SALW control and community safety into the programme from the 
start. In practice, however, there has been a wide gap between theory and practice, with 
poor implementation of the IDDRP and many problems in integrating arms control 
measures into the DDR process. This has fuelled discontent with the mantra of 
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„integration‟ and there are already plans to decouple the SALW control elements from the 
programme. It is therefore most important to assess the case of Sudan more closely, 
because perceptions of this programme are likely to colour attitudes towards 
integration/coordination of DDR and SALW control in the next few years.  
 
Three main reasons can be given for the current failures of the IDDRP in Sudan. The first 
is the systematic failure of the various arms of the UN to achieve properly „integrated‟ 
management of the DDR process even between its own agencies, let alone with the many 
other actors on the ground. SALW control was not directly mentioned in the peace 
agreements or the UNSC resolution that launched the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 
and hence the SALW-related elements of the DDR process are managed by UNDP. 
Similar splits of responsibility are evident throughout the programme, and the case study 
paper discusses in detail many of the practical problems that have been caused by poor 
management and the different agencies‟ inability to „integrate‟ their work.  
 
Secondly, the SALW control agenda was at once far too ambitious, far too vague, and far 
too „integrated‟. UNDP had first explored the possibilities for a „Small Arms and 
Violence Reduction‟ Programme in Sudan in 2003, but by 2004 it had been decided that 
given the complexity of the situation in Sudan, where the distinction between civilians, 
armed forces, and other armed groups was extremely blurred, DDR and SALW control 
should be considered together. Months of planning between the UNDP and the main 
warring parties led to plans both for the disarmament of the two main parties to the 
conflict, and separately for broader civilian arms control under an Arms Reduction and 
Control (ARC) component. In practice, however, the ARC component was not realised, 
apparently because of internecine fighting within the UN as to whether the ARC should 
be part of DDR programming. Instead, some elements of the ARC about community 
security were hived off into a separate Community Security Support component while 
others were ditched. This too, has proved problematic, partly due to a lack of clarity as to 
what is exactly meant by „community security‟, but mostly because of a lack of funding 
and international support for the work. This leads to the third problem, which is that very 
few of the planned SALW measures have actually taken place. Most of the ambitious 
measures that were planned have remained on paper, unimplemented for lack of funding 
and/or lack of clear plans and competent staff. The capacity of the DDR commissions in 
both North and South Sudan is also very low. 
 
As a result of frustrations with the slow pace of the UN-backed arms control process, the 
Government of South Sudan instigated its own civilian disarmament initiatives. These 
were heavy-handed and led to further violence, which spurred UNDP into launching pilot 
SALW control projects in parts of Jonglei state and drafting a new Community Security 
and Arms Control (CSAC) programme for South Sudan. However, this again became 
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mired in disagreements about the extent to which it should be under IDDRP management 
and funded through the IDDRP budget. As a result, the CSAC has so far not been 
implemented. There is now increasing discussion as to whether CSAC should be 
decoupled from the IDDRP, since it is a longer term measure, funds within the IDDRP 
are short anyway, and local actors are reluctant to address civilian SALW control within 
the DDR framework. 
 
At a broader level, the failure so far of SALW control and community safety 
interventions is part of the wider failure of the UN to live up to its ideals of „integrated‟ 
DDR. However, it is also an understandable consequence of plans that were always 
wildly ambitious and probably misguided. This paper has argued that „full‟ integration of 
SALW control into DDR programmes is unwise, and the Sudan example provides a clear 
illustration of why: confusion of objectives, a lack of clarity about the scope of arms 
control measures, significant hostility towards SALW control programmes from DDR 
practitioners and a belief that DDR is being stretched too far. In fact, although SALW 
control and community safety were brought under DDR, it is questionable how far they 
were ever actually integrated. If integration simply means „placing everything under the 
same umbrella‟, rather than finding real synergies between programmes, it is not 
surprising that hostility towards „integrating‟ SALW control may be growing. 
 
4.6 Observations on the case studies 
Both the list of 22 DDR interventions with a SALW control dimension and the four more 
detailed case studies have highlighted various aspects of the inter-relationship between 
DDR and SALW control, and the difficulties of integration/coordination. Although it has 
been possible to identify some examples of good practice, it must be acknowledged that 
they are few and far between. There are some examples were integration/coordination has 
at least been considered and even attempted, and these efforts have faced significant 
obstacles. More often than not, it is not even possible to identify any thought about how 
DDR and SALW control could be better coordinated. This in itself should be a cause of 
concern. If it were the case that the majority of DDR programmes had been highly 
successful without addressing SALW control, it would indeed be possible to argue that 
integration/coordination is unnecessary.  
 
In most cases, however, the DDR process has hit many difficulties, and in many of them 
it can be argued that the lack of thought about how to link DDR to SALW control was a 
contributing factor to these problems. It is indeed worrying that the few attempts at 
integration/coordination that have taken place cannot be shown to have produced much 
better results. Yet this is more likely to be from a lack of experience (combined, in the 
case of Sudan, with over-enthusiasm and overall problems in programme management) 
rather than the inherent impossibility of the task. The case studies actually emphasise that 
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practical steps – often quite small – to improve coordination, such as information 
exchange and joint planning might well have had a positive impact if the capacity, 
funding and political will to implement them had been there. 
 
5. Assessment and Emerging Policy Implications  
This final section aims to bring together some of the key findings and arguments from 
this Thematic Working Paper and to explore their potential policy implications.  
 
5.1 Enhanced co-ordination between DDR and SALW control programmes 
Sections 2 –4 of this paper demonstrate clearly that there are many areas of overlap 
between DDR and SALW programmes, including in their aims and objectives; target 
groups and key stakeholders; and functionally and operationally in each relevant country. 
They both aim to promote both state and human security, and to contribute to the well-
being of the poor and vulnerable as part of their wider contribution to peace and security-
building in countries emerging from war. As such, they need to be integrated into an 
overall post-conflict security-building strategy, in which human security and the interests 
of the poor and vulnerable are given priority alongside concerns with state stabilisation 
and longer term national and regional security and development. In this sense, the 
approach endorsed in the UN IDDRS is very relevant in many contexts.  The planning, 
design and implementation of DDR programmes should systematically aim to ensure that 
they integrate limited but important aspects of SALW control (particularly in relation to 
assessments and to disarmament of those deemed eligible for DDR); and co-ordinate 
effectively with other wider (and often more long-term) dimensions of SALW control 
measures.  
 
The specific priorities for close co-ordination between DDR and SALW programmes 
depend on the circumstances of each case. However, on the basis of programme analysis 
and practical experience discussed in sections 2 – 4 above, where DDR and SALW 
programmes are both present at the same time, they include: 
 Close co-ordination or partial integration for re-planning and needs assessments; 
promoting a conducive political and security environment, and aspects of programme 
planning and design; 
 Close co-ordination and mutual support for developing local „ownership‟ and national 
capacity from the initial stages onwards; 
 Close co-ordination or partial integration of a number of aspects of arms (and 
ammunition) collection, arms registration, „disarmament‟ and arms management and 
destruction processes; 
 Co-ordination in relation to demobilisation programmes and processes (including re-
insertion), particularly to promote the role of SALW control in providing a secure 
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environment in which ex-combatant demobilisation and return to civilian life can take 
place; 
 Co-ordination or partial integration of (recommended) mid-term reviews (perhaps 12 – 
24 months) after the peace settlement), to ensure appropriate priorities and integrated 
approaches to human security and peace-building after the short-term D&D processes 
have taken place; 
 Co-ordination to enhance the role that SALW control measures can play in providing a 
conducive environment for longer-term re-integration, reconciliation and development; 
 Co-ordination to ensure that relevant resources and capabilities developed through the 
DDR programme are retained for the longer-term – taking advantage of the longer-term 
perspective of well-designed SALW programmes.  
 
In practice, it has become clear that programmers and practitioners have increasingly 
recognised at least some of these opportunities and priorities for co-ordination and 
resource-sharing between DDR and SALW control, and there are examples of efforts to 
respond to them. However, it is clear that such co-ordination is relatively rare, either 
through design or implementation. There are a number of obvious factor contributing to 
such poor co-ordination experience so far, including: 
 SALW programmes have only recently emerged as a „normal‟ element of post-conflict 
security building, and thus opportunities for co-ordination have only recently developed 
in practice; 
 Many post-conflict SALW programmes that have taken place have not only been 
delayed, starting as D&D programme elements have been coming to a close or have 
ended, but also have not been anticipated at an early stage – limiting scope for co-
ordination in assessment, planning or design; 
 Many post-conflict SALW programmes have left much to be desired in their own 
terms, and (contrary to accepted good-practice guidelines) have been short-term, ad-hoc 
and partial (rather than having a longer term developmental focus); 
 IDDRS have only recently been developed, and in the prior period DDR planners and 
practitioners tended to have a relatively narrow concept of their objectives; 
 Recently, there has been a damaging tendency to raise unrealistic expectations of what 
can be achieved through DDR programmes and a relatively disorganised debate about 
their potential scope. This contributed to unsuccessful attempts to expand DDR 
programmes to incorporate whole areas of SALW control and community security 
building without sufficiently careful design and management.   
 
Thus, there is no shortage of contingent explanations of why co-ordination between 
SALW and DDR programmes ha been inadequate so far. The priority is to build on our 
foregoing analysis to develop priorities and guidelines for promoting effective co-
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ordination in the future, in the interests of human as well as national and regional security 
and to promote the security and well-being of the poor and vulnerable in particular.  
 
5.2 Taking full account of differing post-conflict contexts 
The IDDRS repeatedly emphasises the importance of adapting guidelines to specific local 
contexts or needs, in order to customise DDR programmes for each case. Nevertheless, 
an important finding emerging from this paper is that the broad approaches recommended 
in the IDDRS (and thus informing at least international decision-making) appear to 
underestimate the extent to which different contexts may imply profound re-structuring 
not only of the ways in which disarmament, demobilisation, and re-integration 
programme element are integrated but also in the ways in which integration and co-
ordination priorities should structure combined approaches to DDR and SALW control. 
Thus, the IDDRS broadly anticipates the SALW programmes should start after DDR 
programmes are underway, with a „classic case‟ expectations that SALW control 
measures will often be launched when implementation of D&D programmes is well-
underway. This is a plausible scenario, and one for which elaborated guidance is useful. 
But recent experience demonstrates that other scenarios are equally possible.  
 
For a range of reasons, DDR programmes may be seriously delayed. In these cases, 
substantial re-orientation or demobilisation of armed groups can be expected to have 
taken place, and many important SALW related issues will have evolved considerably. In 
these contexts, it is not clear that the IDDRS provides best guidance. It may be better to 
aim to launch SALW programmes at a relatively early stage, particularly in view of their 
wider range of programme elements and greater flexibility about target groups and 
phasing. So many DDR programme elements (including special treatment for various 
categories of ex-combatant) implicitly assume that they will take place as short–term 
measures shortly after a peace settlement, and are much harder to justify for programmes 
that are launched after substantial delays. In those contexts, it may be wise to profoundly 
re-think the best ways of integrating DDR and SALW control elements, within an overall 
framework of human security building and conflict prevention. 
 
Similarly, there have been several recent examples of DDR programmes being mandated 
in contexts that are far from conducive to „classic‟ DDR as an integrated short-term 
measure (including South Sudan and Haiti). This was recognised by the programme 
planners, and could have resulted in good co-ordinated programmes focussed on human 
security building if it were not for inter-institutional competition and management 
problems. However, once again, the IDDRS provides inadequate or partial guidance. In 
such highly complex cases, it may be better to abandon the framework of a integrated 
DDR programme altogether, and focus instead on a modular approach, involving the 
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appropriate combination of elements from SALW control, DDR, SSR and transitional 
justice into a customised integrated programme. 
 
Cases such as DDR in Nepal highlights another way in which post-conflict contexts may 
prompt a profound re-orientation of approach towards DDR design and the ways in which 
it aims to co-ordinate or integrate with SALW control (and SSR). In such contexts, the 
DDR programme is highly vulnerable to become subordinated to the interests of powerful 
local political authorities or other parties.  The „form‟ of DDR is retained by agreement 
with local parties, but the processes are driven by considerations other than the orderly 
demobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants. In such contexts, it is important to 
analyse this carefully through assessment and review, and to be prepared to restructure 
the whole approach towards supporting DDR and SALW control.  
 
Conclusions 
The above analysis, if correct, implies that priorities for co-ordination between SALW 
control and DDR measures to promote human security may require much more than 
better implementation of the approaches recommended in the IDDRS. Rather than 
considering how an integrated package of DDR measures can be co-ordinated with 
subsequent wider SALW controls, as envisaged in the IDDRS, in several contexts it may 
be better to take a more modular approach to all of the elements of DDR and SALW, and 
combine those priority elements in a unique package customised for the purpose. This 
may not include some classic elements of DDR – for example, re-integration programmes 
may be treated separately, and integrated with IDP or refugee return. At the same time, 
SALW control measure such as awareness-raising, weapons collection programmes and 
stockpile management may combine closely with elements of D&D. 
 
It is important to recognise that there are nevertheless important contexts for which 
IDDRS is highly relevant: contexts in which an integrated short-term package of 
disarmament, demobilisation and re-insertion measures can be launched shortly after the 
peace settlement. In such contexts, this paper has elaborated opportunities and priorities 
for co-ordination and partial integration with SALW programmes from the earliest stage. 
Plans to support longer-term re-integration processes should be developed early, but 
implemented with a longer term developmental approach, linked with longer term SALW 
control as well as other human security building programmes.  
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